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1 Introduction
Low-skilled immigrants are widely considered a fiscal burden in the United States.1 In his
widely-read blog, Paul Krugman (2006) concludes the following on this issue: “the fiscal burden
of low-wage immigrants is also pretty clear... I think that you’d be hard pressed to find any set
of assumptions under which Mexican immigrants are a net fiscal plus.” The existing empirical
evidence supports this perception: a recent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on the
economic and fiscal consequences of immigration in the U.S. (National Academy of Sciences,
2017) uses state of the art methods to estimate the fiscal impact of immigration to the U.S.2
For most of the scenarios that the report considers, low-skilled immigrants have negative
effects on public finances. The report was politically influential and cited by Donald Trump
in his address to congress in 2017, where he stated: “(a)ccording to the National Academy of
Sciences, our current immigration system costs America’s taxpayers many billions of dollars
a year.”3
The NAS report focuses on direct fiscal effects: taxes paid by the immigrants minus costs
for benefits and services they receive. It abstracts from indirect fiscal effects: changes in
natives’ tax payments that result from general-equilibrium effects. The authors write:
“However, a comprehensive accounting of fiscal impacts is more complicated. Beyond the taxes
they pay and the programs they use themselves, the flow of foreign-born also affects the fiscal
equation for many natives... Because new additions to the workforce may increase or decrease the
wages or employment probabilities of the resident population, the impact on income tax revenues
from immigrant contributions may be only part of the picture. (National Academy of Sciences,
2017, p.248)
In this paper we analyze these so far neglected indirect fiscal effects. We find that one low-
skilled immigrant that enters the U.S. adds between $770 and $2,100 annually to public
finances through this indirect effect. This outweighs the direct fiscal costs for the more op-
timistic scenarios of the NAS report and significantly reduces the fiscal burden in the other
scenarios. Our results therefore challenge the conventional wisdom of low-skilled immigrants
as a fiscal burden.
To make the economic mechanism behind this result transparent, we first consider a simple
textbook setup (Borjas, 2014) with two imperfectly substitutable skill levels and exogenous
labor supply.4 In this setup, low-skilled immigration raises high-skilled wages and lowers
1Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva (2018) found that 15% of survey respondents believed that an average
immigrant received more than twice as much transfers as the average U.S. citizen. According to a 2019 Gallup
poll, the share of Americans that believed immigration made the tax situation worse, was larger than the share
who believed immigration made the US worse off in terms of the economy in general, job opportunities, and
social & moral values (news.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx).
2E.g. they rely on methods used in Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999), Storesletten (2003), Dustmann and
Frattini (2014) and Preston (2014).
3https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-address-congress/
4We generally use the term “natives” to refer to all individuals already in the country at the time of
an immigrant inflow, including foreign-born workers who immigrated earlier. In Sections A.2 and A.4, we
distinguish between native-born and foreign-born workers. This distinction has been highlighted as having
important wage implications in the more recent literature (Peri and Sparber, 2009; Card, 2009; Ottaviano and
Peri, 2012; Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth, 2012; Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler, 2016).
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low-skilled wages. Consequently, tax payments of high-skilled natives increase whereas tax
payments of low-skilled natives decrease. If immigrants are paid their marginal product, what
they contribute to aggregate income is equal to what they receive. Therefore, they affect the
distribution of native income, but not the overall size of national income accruing to natives.
Hence, what the low-skilled natives lose is what high-skilled natives gain. As a consequence,
tax revenue from natives increases if high-skilled individuals face higher marginal tax rates
than low-skilled individuals. We show that this effect boils down to the size of the wage effects
as measured by the own-wage elasticity of low-skilled labor and the progressivity of the tax
system as measured by the difference in the marginal tax rates of the two skill types.5
We then turn to our main model specification that includes two major extensions. First,
workers can respond to immigrant inflows via both intensive and extensive labor supply ad-
justments. The labor supply responses of natives also induce wage effects, which mitigate
the initial wage shocks. Further, they have fiscal consequences themselves; if immigration
decreases native labor force participation, e.g., this would decrease tax revenue. Second, we
enrich the heterogeneity and assume that individual productivity levels are continuously dis-
tributed conditional on skill, as in the “canonical model” (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). We
also allow for labor supply elasticities to differ with income, gender and family status.6
The endogenous labor supply decision of natives creates a nontrivial fixed point problem.
We follow Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2020) and formalize this fixed point problem in
terms of integral equations. We show that the indirect fiscal effect can be expressed as a
closed-form expression of estimable statistics: own-wage elasticities, income-weighted averages
of (i) labor supply elasticities, (ii) marginal effective tax rates, as well as (iii) products of
participation (marginal) tax rates and extensive (intensive) marginal labor supply elasticities
– all conditional on skill level. Component (i) captures mitigation of wage effects by native
labor supply responses. Component (ii) captures fiscal effects from the changes in relative
wages holding labor supply fixed as described above. Component (iii) captures fiscal effects
that arise from changes in native labor supply.
We evaluate this formula for the indirect fiscal benefit by combining data from the American
Community Survey (ACS), the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), and
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). We use the tax calculator TAXSIM
to assign effective tax rates to each individual in our main dataset, the ACS. Immigration
can also affect social security and welfare transfers received by natives, but TAXSIM does not
5High-skilled immigration also leads to indirect fiscal effects. Since low-skilled immigration is much more
politically controversial, we focus on low-skilled immigrants. As we discuss in the conclusion, high-skilled
immigrants could lead to indirect fiscal effects through their effect on productivity and innovation, in addition
to their effect on relative wages and labor supply.
6E.g. Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler (2016, p. 44) emphasize that “wage and employment responses
need to be studied jointly to obtain an accurate picture of the labor market impacts of immigration”. These
authors also highlight that it is important to allow for labor supply responses that vary between different groups
of natives. Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler (2017) demonstrate the importance of this heterogeneity in
labor supply responses empirically in the German context.
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account for welfare-transfer programs nor does it account for future social security receipts.
We therefore use the SIPP to estimate Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) receipts as a function of income and
household characteristics. We use the NLSY79 and the ACS to understand how changes in
current income, combined with the distribution of the individual’s earnings over the life cycle,
affect their receipt of social security payments in the future. Another main component of the
empirical quantification regards the labor supply elasticities along both the intensive and the
extensive margin. We consider different values from the empirical literature and allow these
elasticities to vary with family structure, gender and income.
Combining our empirical quantification of the model with our closed-form solutions for
the indirect fiscal effect, we find that the indirect fiscal effect of one low-skilled immigrant is
$770-$1,470 per year if we consider a plausible range for the elasticity of substitution between
high and low-skilled labor (Card, 2009). We set these numbers into relation to the direct
fiscal effects as reported by the National Academy of Sciences (2017). The report considers
a number of scenarios which vary the marginal cost of public goods and the education of the
immigrant. In almost all cases, the direct fiscal effect is negative and of a similar magnitude
to the indirect fiscal effects we calculated. In some of the scenarios, accounting for the indirect
fiscal costs of immigrant turns the total fiscal effect from a fiscal burden to a fiscal surplus.
Robustness There is some controversy in the literature over the appropriate model to ana-
lyze and estimate the wage effects of immigration. A natural concern is that the indirect fiscal
effects are also sensitive to these modeling choices. Therefore, we extend our model to allow
for a variety of different production functions and labor supply responses. These extensions
and the associated indirect fiscal effects are summarized in Table 1. First, we consider three
alternative production specifications that have been utilized in the immigration literature: 1)
production with four imperfectly substitutable education groups and imperfect substitutabil-
ity between experience levels, as utilized by Borjas (2003), 2) production with imperfectly
substitutable foreign-born and domestic-born workers, as in Ottaviano and Peri (2012), and
3) production where skills are defined by an individual’s position in the wage distribution,
rather than their education, as in Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013). We show that
our formula extends naturally to these more elaborate production technologies. For all three
specifications, we find annual indirect fiscal effects of the average low-skilled immigrant in the
range of $1,000 to $1,870. When we use the same elasticity of substitution between skill levels
in all three specifications, the indirect fiscal effects all lie within $250 of each other.
Next, we consider a model with endogenous task supply as in Peri and Sparber (2009).7 In
the model, low-skilled workers may react to additional low-skilled immigration by ‘upgrading’
7See also Foged and Peri (2016) and Patt, Ruhose, Wiederhold, and Flores (2020) for evidence of native
task supply responses to immigrant inflows. Llull (2018) highlights the importance of occupation adjustments
in mitigating the wage effects of immigration on natives.
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Specification Indirect Effect Section Main Reference/Source of Estimates
Simple Textbook Model $1,104 Section 2 Borjas (2014)
Canonical Model Sections 3 - 5 Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Card (2009)
Exogenous Native Labor Supply $975
Intensive Margin Adjustments $1,113 Chetty (2012), Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2014)
Extensive Margin Adjustments $1,074 “
Both Intensive and Extensive $1,186 “
Education and Experience Groups $1,873 Section A.1 Borjas (2003)
Domestic- and Foreign-Born Complementarity $1,065 Section A.2 Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
Skills by Position in Wage Distribution $1,017 Section A.3 Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013)
Endogenous Task Supply $2,131 Section A.4 Peri and Sparber (2009)
Decreasing Returns to Scale $1,057 Section A.5 Burnside (1996)
Table 1: Estimates of annual indirect fiscal effect of one low-skilled immigrant under different model spec-
ifications. For the “Simple Textbook Model” and the “Canonical Model” we use our results associated with
an elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled workers of 2, the central value we use in
our quantification. For the “Canonical Model” with labor supply adjustments, we display our results with
common labor supply elasticities. For all specifications, we show the indirect effect for the average low-skilled
immigrant. See text for details on each specification.
their occupation. We find an indirect fiscal benefit of over $2,130 in this framework, roughly
half of which is due to occupation upgrading of domestic-born workers.
Finally, we calculate the indirect fiscal effect when production exhibits decreasing returns
to scale. When production exhibits decreasing returns to scale, immigrant inflows not only
change the relative wages between imperfectly substitutable worker groups, but also increase
firm profits at the cost of total worker compensation. We show that this additional effect
can be accommodated with an additional term in our indirect fiscal benefits formula which
accounts for this shift in distribution of national income from workers to firms. Using an
estimate of marginal profit tax rates, we show that the indirect fiscal effect with decreasing
returns is unlikely to be significantly different from the case with constant returns to scale.
Welfare Effects We also show how the indirect fiscal effects change the overall picture of
welfare. We show that the welfare effects of low-skilled immigration can be decomposed into
four components: 1) direct fiscal effects, 2) increases in wage inequality, 3) tax mitigation
effects – which capture how the increase in inequality is dampened by the progressive tax-
transfer system and 4) fiscal externalities – the indirect fiscal effects arising from labor supply
responses of natives to immigrant inflows.
Effects 1) and 2) are well understood. Effect 1) has been studied extensively in the literature
and effect 2) has been alluded to in many studies and the political debate.8 Our contribution
8For example, Borjas (2016, p. 191) writes: “Although the mythical average person may be unaffected,
immigration creates many winners and losers. [...] immigration turns out to be just another government
redistribution program.” Card (2009b, p. 1) writes: “These immigrants presumably compete for the same jobs
held by the least-skilled native workers, contributing to a trifecta of economic factors – technology, trade and
immigration – that are thought to have led to a rise in skill differentials in the US economy since the late
1970s.” Krugman (2006a) notes the following in a New York times Op-Ed: “Because Mexican immigrants have
much less education than the average U.S. worker, they increase the supply of less-skilled labor, driving down
the wages of the worst-paid Americans”.
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here is to apply recent methods in public economics (Saez and Stantcheva, 2016; Hendren,
2020) to quantify the welfare loss associated with the increase in inequality. We show that the
size of these welfare losses is very sensitive to how (i) domestic-born versus previous immigrants
are weighted in the welfare function9 and (ii) whether immigrants and natives are substitutes or
complements conditional on skill. E.g. for the framework and estimates of Ottaviano and Peri
(2012), which incorporate complementarity between domestic- and foreign-born workers, we
find that effect 2) is actually positive for domestic-born individuals – while inequality increases
among domestic-born, the average wage among domestic-born natives increases sufficiently to
outweigh the increase in inequality.
Effects 3) and 4) are the novel elements that our paper adds to the literature. They
capture the welfare effects resulting from the interplay of low-skilled immigration and native
tax payments and are directly tied with the indirect fiscal effect. For our main model, we find
that they imply an additional, so far neglected, welfare gain between $789 and $1,166.10
To sum up, quantifying the overall welfare effect of low-skilled immigration is difficult
because the decision of how to weigh domestic-born versus previous immigrants is a thorny
normative issue whose discussion goes beyond the goals of this paper. Perhaps even more
difficult is how to weigh the utility of potential immigrants. The welfare gains of immigrating
to the United States for low-skilled individuals are likely to be very large, given that low-skilled
immigrants experience massive income gains after moving to the United States (Hendricks
and Schoellman, 2018). Therefore, the welfare effects of immigration are sensitive to how
previous and potential immigrants are weighted in comparison to natives. The sensitivity of
the conclusion regarding welfare effects contrasts with our findings on the indirect fiscal effects
which are very robust across the different models. We therefore put a much stronger emphasis
on the fiscal effects than on the welfare effects in this paper.
Related Literature The literature that studies the fiscal effects of immigration has primar-
ily focused on the direct fiscal effect. Preston (2014) provides a comprehensive overview on
the topic. Economists have employed a variety of methods to measure this direct fiscal impact
of immigration. Borjas and Hilton (1996) quantify how much more likely immigrants are to
participate in welfare programs. Dustmann and Frattini (2014) provide a detailed accounting
approach for the UK and find that EEA (non EEA) immigrants on average contributed more
(less) to public finances than public costs they cause. They emphasize the importance of
accounting for the use of public goods and potential congestion externalities.11
9The choice of welfare weights is generally a normative question. Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva (2018,
Figure 13) find that less than 40% of Americans agree to the following statement “The government should care
equally about everyone living in the country whether born there or not”.
10These numbers correspond to the case where labor supply is elastic along both the extensive and intensive
margin and elasticities are set according to Chetty (2012).
11Ruist (2015) estimates the fiscal burden of refugee immigration to be 1% of GDP in Sweden. Monras,
Vázquez-Grenno, and Elias (2018) find that a policy which legalized 600,000 undocumented immigrants in
Spain led to increases in payroll tax revenues, which includes both direct and indirect fiscal effects.
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Storesletten (2000) takes a model-based perspective and quantifies the net present value of
fiscal contributions of an immigrant as a function of age and education for the U.S. Storesletten
(2003) provides a similar calculation for Sweden. Relatedly, several papers use quantitative
equilibrium models to study the welfare effects of immigration in the presence of progressive
taxation (Chojnicki, Docquier, and Ragot, 2011; Battisti, Felbermayr, Peri, and Poutvaara,
2018; Busch, Krueger, Ludwig, Popova, and Iftikhar, 2020). Indirect fiscal effects are present
in these models. Our contribution is to explicitly work out the size of the indirect fiscal
effects and the mechanism behind it. While such indirect fiscal effects have been mentioned
previously, the conjecture was that the effects are of second order compared to the direct fiscal
effects.12
This paper is also related to a large literature on the effects of immigration on natives wages.
A number of papers find that low-skilled immigration leads to increases in wages inequality, but
there is less consensus on which workers bear the largest incidence of low-skilled immigration
(see e.g. Card (1999), Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2012), Dustmann et al. (2013)).
Among other things, the different results come from different assumptions on skill stratification
(2 vs. 4 education levels or the wage percentile as skill measure)13 and the assumptions of
whether natives and immigrants, conditional on skill, are (im)perfect substitutes.
Further, a smaller literature emphasizes the importance of labor supply and employment
responses in understanding the effects of immigration (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997;
Peri and Sparber, 2009; Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler, 2016; Llull, 2018; Piyapromdee,
2020; Monras, 2020). We show analytically how endogenous labor supply choices mitigate
the wage changes but also have fiscal effects in itself. Further, we rely on this large empirical
literature to guide our modeling decisions while also doing justice to the fact that there is some
disagreement in the empirical literature over the appropriate model to analyze the effects of
immigration. We show that our main results are robust to different modeling choices and
parameter estimates from the empirical immigration literature.
Roadmap In Section 2 we use a simple benchmark model to illustrate the mechanism be-
hind the indirect fiscal effect transparently. Section 3 presents our main quantitative model
and Section 4 presents our empirical quantification. Section 5 presents our main quantita-
tive results. In Section 6, which evaluate the indirect fiscal effects under various alternative
environments. Section 7 discusses further issues and Section 8 concludes.
12 Preston (2014, p. 580) writes “(w)hile interesting, the implied tax effects are not plausibly large relative
to the effects that will be found by a simple accounting approach.”
13Card (1999) finds that the overall impact of immigration to the United States on wage inequality has
been small. This is largely due to the fact that the skill composition of immigrants is similar to that of natives.
Therefore, immigration overall has not lead to large changes in factor ratios in the United States. This does
not imply that low-skilled immigration in isolation does not affect inequality. In fact, the value of the elasticity
of substitution that we use in our main model are those that are favored by Card (1999).
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2 The Simple Benchmark Model
To highlight our result transparently, we start with the simple textbook model for the impact
of immigration on native wages (Borjas, 2014; Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 2009). Consider
an economy that is populated by individuals that are either high-skilled or low-skilled. The
mass of low-skilled individuals is Nu and the mass of high-skilled individuals is Ns. Denote
individual labor supply by hu and hs. Production of the single consumption good, whose
price is normalized to one, is described by a constant returns to scale production function
Y = F (Lu,Ls) where Lu = Nuhu and Ls = Nshs denote the aggregate labor of each
respective skill level. We assume that low- and high-skilled labor are imperfect substitutes in
production of the single final good, the price of which is normalized to one. In equilibrium,
profits are zero and wages are equal to marginal products, i.e. we = @F@Le for e = u, s. Finally,
denote income of the two types of workers by ys = hsws and yu = huwu and denote aggregate
income of the skill levels by Ys = ysNs and Yu = yuNu.
For simplicity, we consider a very stylized tax system. ⌧u is the tax rate on low-skilled
income and ⌧s is the tax rate on high-skilled income, where ⌧u < ⌧s is a stylized way of
capturing tax progressivity. Further, let Cu and Cs represent per-person costs which do not
depend on income, representing, for example, public goods or schooling costs associated with
each low- and high-skilled individual, respectively. Tax revenue in this economy is given by
R = Nu (⌧uyu   Cu) +Ns (⌧sys   Cs) .
In the following, we formally study how tax revenue R changes due to a small influx of
low-skilled immigrants dNu. This influx has a direct fiscal effect
dRdir = (⌧uyu   Cu)⇥ dNu. (1)
One low-skilled immigrant contributes (⌧uyu   Cu) to the public budget. As stated above, this
direct fiscal effect has already received much attention in the literature and is not the subject
of this paper.14
The immigration influx also has an indirect fiscal effect. Given that labor of different skill
levels are imperfect substitutes in production, the increase of the low-skilled (high-skilled)
workforce by dNu decreases (increases) the wage of low-skilled (high-skilled) workers and








14The report of the National Academy of Sciences (2017) includes federal, state and local taxes, incarceration
costs, scholarship and student loan costs, education costs, government healthcare costs, veteran’s benefits,
refugee support costs, public good costs, and a variety of federal and state level transfer programs in their
calculation of direct fiscal effects.
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The following lemma helps to relate the size of the wage increase of the low-skilled and the
wage increase of the high-skilled.
Lemma 1. If the production function is characterized by constant returns to scale, then ag-







dNu = 0 (3)












Proof. Note that with constant returns to scale one has F (Nuhu, Nshs) = wuNuhu + wsNshs.
Differentiating both sides w.r.t. to Nu and using @F@Lu = wu yields the result.
Intuitively, immigrants obtain their marginal product and do not affect the size of the
overall pie accruing to natives. Immigrants only affect the distribution of the pie between
high- and low-skilled natives. The income loss of one group equals the income gain of the
other group.15 This relation is formally given by (3) and it provides a direct relation between
the cross-wage elasticity of high-skilled labor  s,cross and the own-wage elasticity of low-skilled
labor  u,own. Based on Lemma 1, we can easily simplify the indirect fiscal effect and rewrite
it as stated in the following proposition.16
Proposition 1. If native labor supply is exogenous, the indirect fiscal effect of low-skilled
immigration dNu is given by
dRind = (⌧s   ⌧u)⇥ | u,own|⇥ yu ⇥ dNu. (4)
Proof. First, note that (3) implies Nshs @ws@Nu =  Nuhu
@wu
@Nu
. Inserting this into the indirect











which then yields (4).
The formula for the indirect fiscal effect (4) is very simple and allows for a straightforward
interpretation.17 Since the change in overall income of natives is unaffected as shown in
15If the immigration influx is not infinitesimal, then there would indeed be an immigration surplus, i.e.
aggregate native labor income would increase. However, the immigration surplus would be second order
compared to the distributional implications, see e.g. (Borjas, 2014, Chapter 7).
16As discussed in Footnote 5, we focus on low-skilled immigration since it is more politically controversial.
However, it is straightforward to do the analysis for high-skilled immigrants, where the formula would read as
(⌧u   ⌧s)⇥ | s,own|⇥ ys ⇥ dNs.
17A result that may be surprising, is that it is independent of the size of the native population. To
understand this intuitively, consider two countries where skills are distributed in the same way, but the first
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Lemma 1, the change in tax payment of natives would be zero if ⌧s = ⌧u. However, if taxes are
progressive (⌧s > ⌧u), aggregate tax payment of natives increases. High-skilled individuals,
whose income increases, are taxed at a higher rate than low-skilled individuals, whose income
decreases. The size of the effect is proportional to low-skilled income and the own-wage
elasticity of low-skilled wages.18
Formula (4) allows for a straightforward quantification. As a normalization, we set dNu = 1,
i.e. we normalize it to one marginal immigrant. For a CRS production function, the own-wage
elasticity is given by  u,own =
Nsys
Nuyu+Nsys
  , where   is the elasticity of substitution, which we
assume to be in [1.5, 2.5] (Card, 2009). Importantly, as we show in Appendix B.1, this relation
does not require the elasticity of substitution to be constant – we are not imposing a CES
production function. To quantify this, we use data from the 2017 American Community
Survey (ACS). Average earnings of high school and college-education were yu = $36, 079 and
ys = $67, 432, respectively. Further, we know that the share of workers with and without
college education was .65 and .35.19 As a final step, we need to quantify ⌧s   ⌧u. We take
the approximation of the U.S. tax code by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017) which
implies ⌧s = 0.254 and ⌧u = 0.180. This implies that the indirect fiscal effect is given by
dRind 2 [828, 1380].
This is a sizeable number even if we consider the lower range of wage effects (i.e.   = 2.5).20
This indicates that the indirect fiscal effect should not be ignored in policy discussions. We
will now be more serious about its calculation and address various shortcomings of this simple
model. First, wage effects are likely to be smaller since native labor supply (or native behavior
more generally – they may move or change their occupation) is endogenous. Second, the
production structure is simplistic in the sense that all workers of the same skill level have
exactly the same productivity. Other production structures may be equally likely: e.g. even
conditional on skill, natives and immigrants may be imperfect substitutes. Further, one can
change the assumptions about the elasticity of capital supply (which was implicitly assumed
country is twice as large as the second. In the first country, the wage changes of natives due to one immigrant
are smaller by a factor of two – one immigrant is ‘smaller’ in relative terms in country 1 as compared to country
2. However, at the same time, there are twice as many natives whose tax payment is affected in country 1.
Thus, the fiscal effect is the same in both economies.
18Note that the increase in tax revenue comes at the cost of native net incomes. However, in modern
welfare analysis income gains of different individuals and tax revenue are not weighted equally and therefore
this redistribution between individuals and the government has first-order welfare effects (Hendren, 2020), see
also our discussion in Section 3.2. Additionally, when we account for endogenous labor supply of natives in the
next sections, low-skilled immigration causes fiscal externalities which also have immediate welfare implications
(Hendren, 2015).
19Throughout the paper, we follow Borjas (2003), Peri and Sparber (2009), and Ottaviano and Peri (2012),
and define low-skilled workers as those without any college experience and define high-skilled workers as
workers with at least some college experience. In Appendix D.3, we consider an alternative skill classification,
in which we divide workers with some college between the two skill groups as in Katz and Murphy (1992) or
Card (2009). In Section A.3, we define worker skills by their position in the wage distribution, rather than
their education.
20We find dRind =$1,104 given our intermediate value for the elasticity of substitution of   = 2.
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to be infinite so far), returns to scale and perfect competition. Finally, the tax function
considered here is too simplistic.
We address these issues one by one. First, in the next section, we move to what we consider
our main or benchmark model. We extend the simple model by (i) allowing for a continuum
of productivities (and therefore income levels) conditional on skill and (ii) accounting for
endogenous labor supply of natives along the extensive and intensive margin. In Section 4,
we introduce our quantification of the tax-transfer system, which accounts for social security
payments and welfare receipts in addition to income and payroll taxes. In Section 6, we then
consider the robustness of the results for the other mentioned issues like skill-stratification,
occupational choice of natives, imperfect substitutability of natives and immigrants etc.
3 The Main Model: Heterogeneity and Endogenous Labor
Supply of Natives
We generalize the findings from the previous section in two important ways. First, we consider
the so-called canonical model (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011) with two skill levels (corresponding
to individuals with and without college education), and a continuous distribution of produc-
tivity for each skill level. We also allow individuals to differ in other variables that may affect
their tax payment. Second, we account for endogenous labor supply of natives along both the
extensive and the intensive margin. We introduce the additional heterogeneity and show how
the formula for the indirect fiscal effect in Proposition 1 extends to this setting in Section 3.1.
We then extend the setting to endogenous labor supply of natives in Section 3.2.
3.1 Incorporating Heterogeneity
An individual is indexed by its type i 2 I. A type contains many characteristics. First,
individuals differ in their skill level ei 2 {u, s}. Second, they differ in their productivity !i.
Third, they differ in terms of their tax payments: even if they have the same income, they may
face a different tax schedule because of family status, living in a different state etc. Finally,
different types differ in their participation rates ⌫i and their labor supply elasticities: "i is the
hours elasticity, ⌘i is the participation elasticity and ⇠i = "i + ⌘i is the total hours elasticity.
Denote by Li = hi⌫imi aggregate labor of type i, where hi is hours worked of type i and mi
is the measure of type i. We first focus on the case of exogenous labor supply of natives and
therefore set "i = ⌘i = 0 and ⌫i = 1 for all i. In Section 3.2, we remove this assumption.





for e 2 {u, s}, where Iu ( Is ) is a subset of I made up of low-skilled (high-skilled) types.
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The production function reads as F (Lu,Ls) and we assume constant returns to scale.
Wages are equal to marginal products (we = @F@Le ) and aggregate income is given by Ye = weLe.
Hence, an individual of type i has gross income yi = hi!iwei , where the latter element,
the skill price we is endogenous w.r.t. the skill ratio, LsLu . We again define the own-wage
elasticities  e,own = dwedLe
Le
we
and the cross-wage elasticities  e,cross = dwedLe0
Le0
we
with e 6= e0. The
following lemma generalizes the relationship between the own- and cross-wage elasticities given
by Lemma 1 to this setting.





Before we show how Proposition 1 extends to this setting, we need to specify the tax and
transfer system. We incorporate a flexible nonlinear tax and transfer system T (y, i) that maps
a tax payment (which could be negative, i.e. transfer receipt) to each level of gross income y
and type i. Proposition 1 generalizes as follows:
Proposition 2. Assume that labor supply of natives is exogenous. The fiscal effect of one
immigrant of type i with low education (i.e. ei = u) is given by:
dRexind(i) = | u,own|⇥ yi ⇥
 
T̄ 0s   T̄ 0u
 
, (5)
where T̄ 0e is the income-weighted average marginal tax rate of education group e.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.1.
The formula is very similar to the formula in Proposition 1 but there are two differences.
First, we have to specify not only the education level of the immigrant but also the type i and
therefore the income yi. A type with higher income yi supplies a greater amount of effective
labor and therefore has a larger effect on native wages. Second, since there are more than two
marginal tax rates in this economy, the objects of interest are the income-weighted average
marginal tax rates of the two skill groups. Intuitively, wages of all college (high-school) workers
increase (decrease) by the same factor. An individual with a higher income level will therefore
experience a larger absolute change in earnings. To calculate the fiscal effect, the marginal
tax rate of an individual with a higher income therefore receives a higher weight.
3.2 Incorporating Endogenous Native Labor Supply
With endogenous labor supply, the changes in the wages for low- and high-skilled labor affect
labor supply decisions along the intensive and extensive margin of workers with non-zero
elasticities. The implied changes in labor supply, in turn, affect the equilibrium wages again,
which then triggers a change in labor supply and so on and so forth. All these adjustment
effects will imply additional fiscal effects.
11




(T (yi, i)⌫i + T (0, i)(1  ⌫i))midi+
Z
Is
(T (yi, i)⌫i + T (0, i)(1  ⌫i))midi,
where T (0, i) is the effective tax paid by type i if they earn zero income. The following lemma
states how tax payments of natives change due to low-skilled immigration.
Lemma 3. Consider a low-skilled immigrant with effective labor supply LIm that implies
equilibrium changes in wages of dwuwu and
dws
ws




























where Tpart(yi) = T (yi,i) T (0,i)yi is the participation tax rate of a type i individual that earns yi.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.2.
In the first line, the indirect fiscal effects as described in Proposition 1 are scaled up by the
intensive margin elasticities. The second line of (6) captures the change in tax revenue due
to changes in labor force participation of natives. Note that the relevant tax rate here is not
the marginal tax rate, but the participation tax rate. The participation tax rate captures the
increase in public finances that occurs if the individual starts to work.




to the labor supply responses. To obtain an expression for these wage changes and hence
obtain a closed form solution, we follow Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2020) and formalize
the associated fixed point in terms of integral equations.21 First, note that these equilibrium
wage changes can be divided into the effects arising from immigrant inflows, low-skilled native





















The first term captures the wage change induced by immigration directly since LImLu captures
the relative increase in effective low-skilled labor supply due to one immigrant with effective
labor LIm. The second term captures the own-wage effects implied by the change in low-skilled
aggregate labor of natives and the third term captures the cross-wage effects implied by the
21Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2020) study nonlinear tax reforms in a general equilibrium setting with
endogenous labor supply and also highlight that a decrease in the skill ratio can trigger tax revenue effects in
the case of progressive taxation.
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change in high-skilled aggregate labor. Similarly, the equilibrium wage change for high-skilled





















How the equilibrium changes in relative wages translate into labor supply changes directly
follows from the definition of labor supply elasticities. The integral equations that describes
the relative change in total hours worked for low-skilled workers can therefore be written as:

























The bracket on the right hand side captures the equilibrium change in the relative wage dwuwu .
The relative change in labor supply of type i individuals is then simply given by the total hours
elasticity ⇠i multiplied with the relative wage change. Equivalently, for high-skilled labor, the
integral equation reads as

























The expressions given by (9) and (10) constitute a system of integral equations. In Ap-
pendix B.2.3 we derive the following result on the wage changes in general equilibrium .
Lemma 4. Consider a small influx of a low-skilled immigrant with effective labor LIm. The
















where ⇠̄u and ⇠̄s are the income-weighted total hours elasticities of the two skill groups.22
Proof. See Appendix B.2.3.
Note that absent native labor supply responses, an immigrant inflow leads to percentage
low-skilled wage change of ˆdwuwu =  u,own
LIm
Lu






. We’ll refer to these wage effects without labor supply responses as “first-
round effects”. This lemma shows that, with labor supply responses, the changes in equilibrium
wages are given by these first-round effects scaled by 1
1+⇠̄u| u,own|+⇠̄s| s,own| < 1, capturing how
much these first-round effects are mitigated by labor supply responses. Greater labor supply
responsiveness, as measured by the income-weighted total hours elasticities of the different





for e 2 {u, s}.
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groups, implies a larger mitigation of the first round effects. This effect plays an important
role because it mitigates the indirect fiscal effects that follow from the wage changes.
However, in addition to mitigating wage effects, the labor supply changes of natives also
have fiscal implications themselves. The changes in equilibrium hours, participation, and
aggregate labor supply directly follow from Lemma 4 and the definition of the elasticities


















for e 2 {u, s} and where dwewe is defined as in Lemma 4.
We now combine Lemma 2, Lemma 4, and these equilibrium labor supply changes to rewrite
the expression in Lemma 3 and obtain our main result.
Proposition 3. The indirect fiscal effect of a low-skilled immigrant of type i is given by:
dRind(i) =
yi ⇥ | u,own|
1 + ⇠̄u| u,own|+ ⇠̄s| s,own|
 








is the income-weighted average of the product of the participation tax rate and the participation






is the income-weighted average of the product of of the marginal tax rate and the hours elasticity
of education group e.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.4.
How does this formula differ from that in Proposition 2? First of all the indirect fiscal effect
is scaled down by 1
1+⇠̄u| u,own|+⇠̄s| s,own| since the wage effects are mitigated. Second, in addition
to the difference of the income-weighted marginal tax rates T̄ 0s   T̄ 0u, the formula accounts for
the fiscal effects caused by native labor supply responses, which can be thought of as fiscal
externalities. The term "sT 0s captures that high-skilled natives increase their hours worked
and pay more taxes while "uT 0u captures that low-skilled natives decrease their hours worked
and pay less taxes. The term ⌘sTpart,s ( ⌘uTpart,u ) captures the increase (decrease) in labor
force participation of high-skilled (low-skilled).
We can decompose the indirect fiscal effect into the effect arising from differences in relative
wages and the fiscal externalities as





1 + ⇠̄u| u,own|+ ⇠̄s| s,own|
 






1 + ⇠̄u| u,own|+ ⇠̄s| s,own|
 
"sT 0s   "uT 0u + ⌘sTpart,s   ⌘uTpart,u
!
. (11)
These fiscal externalities have different welfare implications than the indirect fiscal effects
that come from changes in relative wages holding labor supply fixed in that they capture
efficiency gains for the natives. We now describe this in greater detail.
3.3 Welfare Effects
We now briefly describe how the indirect fiscal effect affects the overall picture of welfare.
Characterizing the welfare effects is difficult, as low-skilled immigration leads to winners and
losers. The welfare effects therefore depend crucially on how the social planner weighs the
utility of different income groups, foreign-born versus domestic-born workers, and, perhaps
more difficultly, on potential immigrants versus individuals in the United States. The welfare
gains of low-skilled immigrants are likely to be very large, given that low-skilled immigrants
experience massive income gains after moving to the United States (Hendricks and Schoellman,
2018). In what follows, the welfare calculation do not account for the welfare gains of the
immigrants themselves. We get back to the issue of welfare gains of immigrants themselves in
Section 5.3.
Concretely, let g(i) denote the welfare weight of individual i, such that g(i) gives the increase
in social welfare – measured in units of public funds – associated with a one unit increase in
income for individual i. These weights are normalized such that on average they are equal to
one and one is the weight on government revenue (Saez and Stantcheva, 2016). The welfare
surplus associated with one low-skilled immigrant is given by Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The weighted surplus accruing to natives for one low-skilled immigrant is
given by:
Surplusweighted(i) =













1 + ⇠̄u| u,own|+ ⇠̄s| s,own|
⇥
 ⇣




T̄ 0u   gu (T 0u)
⌘!
,
and where dRdir(i) is the direct fiscal effect, FiscExternalities(i) is the fiscal externality as
defined by (11), ge is the income-weighted average of the welfare weights conditional on skill e
and ge (T 0e) is the income-weighted average of the product of the welfare weights and marginal
tax rates conditional on skill e.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.5.
Recall that the fiscal externality is the additional tax revenue generated by native labor
supply responses. Note that the fiscal externality term would be zero if (i) labor supply of
natives were exogenous or (ii) the tax system were proportional and labor supply elasticities
were common between low- and high-skilled workers. The endogeneity of labor supply com-
bined with the progressivity of the tax system jointly imply a welfare surplus: while the labor
supply responses do not directly affect native welfare due to the envelope theorem, they affect
native welfare through their implied indirect fiscal effects.
The term Distributional(i) captures the mechanical distributional effects between high-
skilled and low-skilled natives resulting from the change in relative wages. These distributional
effects are partially mitigated by the tax system, as captured by the term TaxMitigation(i).
In particular, the term
⇣
T̄ 0e   ge (T 0e)
⌘
captures that an increase (decrease) in wages for high-
skilled (low-skilled) is partially offset by the tax code. We now consider two special cases for
the welfare weights.
Kaldor-Hicks Immigration Surplus. The “immigration surplus”, an application of the
Kaldor-Hicks compensation test (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939, 1940), is a leading approach to
study welfare in the immigration literature (see e.g. Borjas (2014)). The immigration surplus
measures whether the natives hurt by immigration could hypothetically be compensated by
those who benefit and is given by the sum of government revenue and the monetized gains
and losses of all the natives. Note that the immigration surplus is simply a special case of the
welfare effect in Proposition 4 with g(i) = 1 for all i. In this case, the welfare effect is simply
given by the direct fiscal effects plus the fiscal externality. Both the distributional effects and
tax mitigation effects are equal to zero because each dollar would be valued equally regardless
of whether it accrues to high-skilled natives or low-skilled natives or to the government. The
fact that this surplus is non-zero beyond the direct fiscal effect is novel.
Inverse-Optimum Weights. In our quantification, we calculate the welfare effects of im-
migration using the so-called inverse optimum weights as in Hendren (2020). These are the
welfare weights for which the current U.S. tax-transfers system is optimal according to opti-
mality conditions from the optimal income tax literature. Hendren (2020) shows that by using
these weights, one can extend the Kaldor-Hicks surplus to account for distortionary costs of
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compensation.23 If the welfare effect is positive with such weights, then a Pareto improvement
can be achieved because the losers can be compensated.24
For the U.S., Hendren (2020) calibrates a weight function which is generally decreasing
in income and thus gives higher weight to low-skilled than high-skilled individuals. For such
weights, low-skilled immigration will lead to negative distributional effects because the income
losses of low-skilled receive a higher weight than the income gains of high-skilled.
Additionally, we consider the effects of immigration on domestic-born welfare, in which the
utility of previous immigrants are not weighted in welfare calculations. We use the weights
from Hendren (2020) to weight domestic-born utility and normalize the weights such that they
are equal to one on average.
4 Empirical Quantification
To quantify the formula of Proposition 3, we need earnings distributions conditional on edu-
cation. Further, we need to know marginal and participation tax rates as well as labor supply
elasticities along the earnings distributions. Note that even conditional on education and in-
come, there is a distribution of tax rates and elasticities since family status, age, location, etc.
are also determinants of an individual’s tax burden and labor supply elasticity. Finally, we
need a value for the own-wage elasticity of low-skilled wages.25
In Section 4.1, we make assumptions on parameters such as labor supply elasticities for
different groups and wage elasticities. The calibrated values are based on existing empirical
evidence.
Regarding the values of marginal and participation tax rates, we conduct our own empiri-
cal analysis.26 To obtain our sample of natives, we use data from the American Community
Survey (ACS). To assign effective marginal and participation tax rates to all individuals in
the sample, we make use of NBER’s TAXSIM. However, TAXSIM does not account for the
effective tax rates that are implied by welfare-transfer programs. Programs like the Supple-
mentary Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) imply an increase in effective marginal tax rates since transfers are phased out as
23Going one step further, Tsyvinski and Werquin (2019) generalize the compensation principle to a setting
where distortive taxes also imply general equilibrium effects on wages, which creates a complicated fixed-point
problem. The authors analytically describe the tax reform that achieves compensation in such a setting.
24One underlying assumption that this can be achieved with a standard tax schedule, is that for a given
income level, all individuals are affected in the same way. This assumption is apparently violated in our model
where at a certain income level, both low and high-skilled individuals are present and hence compensating
policies would need to condition on skill.
25The raw data and code necessary to calculate effective marginal tax rates for all individuals in the ACS,
calculate the income-weight effective tax rates, and calculate the main results in Table 3 are available for
download at https://sites.google.com/site/markyaucolas/research.
26The Congressional Budget Office estimates effective marginal tax rates for low- and medium- income
workers in the U.S. (Congressional Budget Office, 2015). We cannot use their estimates directly as they only
provide the median, 10th and 90th percentile of marginal tax rates for different income groups. Further their
calculations do not include workers with income over 450% of the Federal Poverty Line and do not account
for TANF of SSI payments.
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income increases. To account for this, we use data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). With the SIPP, we estimate effective transfer phase-out rates conditional
on household size and income. Another important detail that is not captured in TAXSIM is
that the payroll tax is not a pure tax because higher earnings imply not only higher taxes
but also higher benefits when retired (see e.g. Feldstein and Samwick (1992)). Accounting for
this requires estimates of individuals’ life-cycle earnings, which determine how current income
affects future social security benefits. To predict the life-cycle earnings paths of the individu-
als in our sample, we make use of panel data from the NLSY79. We describe all the sample
selection in Section 4.2 and the effective tax rate calibration in Section 4.3.27
4.1 Calibrated Parameters





where   is the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled individuals and s
is the income share of high-skilled labor, which we estimate as s = .79, using our ACS sample
(see description in the next section). For  , Card (2009) concludes that values are likely to be
between 1.5 and 2.5, which implies own-wage elasticities ranging from -.51 (  = 1.5) to -.31





where u is the income share of low-skilled labor. For our range of values for  , this implies
own-wage elasticity for high-skilled workers ranging from -.14 (  = 1.5) to -.08 (  = 2.5).
Labor Supply Elasticities A number of papers emphasize that labor supply elasticities
differ across genders, marital statuses, and income levels but few papers have actually esti-
mated these elasticities across the income distribution for both genders. We therefore employ
three different approaches to calibrate our labor supply elasticities. As a first pass, we assume
all individuals have common intensive and extensive labor supply elasticities. Specifically, we
set the intensive margin elasticity of "i = .33 and an extensive margin elasticity of ⌘i = .25,
for all individuals i, based on the pooled estimates in Chetty (2012).29 Next, we allow labor
27Our quantification could be extended to account for the taxation of interest and pension income, estate
taxes and government sponsored healthcare for natives. Accounting for income and pension income and estate
taxes would likely lead to larger indirect fiscal effects, given higher savings rates of high-skilled individuals
and the progressivity of estate taxes. Accounting for government sponsored heathcare for natives would lead
to smaller indirect fiscal effects as Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act subsidies are means tested.
28Katz and Murphy (1992), for example, find an elasticity of substitution of 1.4. Card and Lemieux (2001)
estimate an elasticity of substitution between 1.15 and 1.6 in their pooled sample of men and women.
29In fact, these numbers of Chetty (2012) refer to compensated, Hicksian elasticities while the elasticities in
our formulas are uncompensated elasticities. As argued e.g. by Chetty et al. (2013), uncompensated elasticities
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supply elasticities to vary by gender and marital status. We use estimates of gender and
marital status specific intensive and extensive labor supply elasticities from Bargain, Orsini,
and Peichl (2014), who estimate a discrete choice model to estimate elasticities. Finally, we
consider the scenario in which labor supply elasticities can vary by gender, age, and income.
For this we use estimates of intensive and extensive labor supply elasticities by gender, marital
status and quintile of the income distribution from Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2014).30
Other parameters. We assume that agents start receiving social security at age 66. We
assume the real discount rate for the government to be 1%.31 Finally, the formula in Proposi-
tion 3 shows that the income of the immigrants also plays a role beyond the education status.
Since the exact income of an immigrant is not foreseeable before an immigrant has entered
the country, we consider the case of taking expected immigrant income as reasonable. Using
again data from the ACS, we find that the average annual gross income of a low-skilled im-
migrant worker in our sample is $30,317. We also consider the indirect fiscal effects of high
school dropout immigrants and high school graduate immigrants, who have average incomes
of $25,861 and $33,442, respectively.
4.2 Data and Sample
ACS Our main data source is the 2017 ACS, which includes information on income and
demographics for a nationally representative sample of 1% of the U.S. population. As is
standard, we focus on individuals between 18 and 65 years old and eliminate individuals
living in group quarters. In order to ensure that we can accurately determine an individual’s
tax-filing status, we limit our sample to heads of households and their spouses. This leaves us
with a sample of over 1.2 million individuals.32 We utilize data on each individual’s earnings,
income from other sources, marital status, age, location, number and ages of children, and age
and income of the individual’s spouse, all of which determine an individual’s tax liability and
eligibility for various tax credits and deductions.33 We also utilize data on each individual’s
are likely to be only slightly smaller than compensated elastiticies as microeconometric evidence shows income
effects are small. Accounting for this would push our results below in Table 3 with endogenous labor supply
closer to the values with exogenous labor supply in the same table.
30The intensive and extensive labor supply elasticities from Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2014) are reported
in Appendix C.4. We choose to utilize the labor supply estimates from Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2014)
because they estimate gender and income specific intensive and extensive margin elasticities using a common
estimation procedure. Our results are very similar if we use estimates on extensive labor supply elasticities
by wage percentile from Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002), who estimate extensive margin elasticities using a
sample of U.S. men.
31The real interest rate on 30 year bonds was on average 0.99 (0.81) in the last ten (five) years. See https://
home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financing-the-government/interest-rate-statistics. We show
our main results under the assumption of a 2% interest rate in Appendix D.2
32Additional details on sample selection in the ACS are included in Appendix C.1.
33Top wage incomes are underrepresented in most survey data sets. We therefore append Pareto tails to
the wage income distribution, starting at the highest wage income value that is not top-coded in each state,
as is relatively common practice in the optimal tax literature (Piketty and Saez, 2013). We assume a shape
parameter of ↵ = 1.5.
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education, which we use to determine an individual’s skill group. An important choice is
how to define these skill groups. For this, we follow Borjas (2003), Peri and Sparber (2009),
and Ottaviano and Peri (2012), and define low-skilled workers as those without any college
experience and define high-skilled workers as workers with at least some college experience.34
Figure 1 shows the density of individual earnings for high-skilled and low-skilled workers
given our baseline definition of skills. Overall, low-skilled individuals have average earnings of
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Figure 1: Kernel density plot of individual earnings for low-skilled and high-skilled individuals in our sample
conditional on having positive earnings. We truncate the graph at income of $300,000. We define low-skilled
individuals as those without any college experience and define high-skilled individuals as workers with at least
some college experience.
SIPP We also incorporate data from the SIPP, a nationally representative sample with
detailed data on respondents’ participation in income transfer programs, thereby allowing us
to understand how benefits receipt varies across the earnings distribution. In particular, we
utilize data from waves 1-4 of the 2014 SIPP, which includes monthly data on approximately
53,000 households from 2013 to 2016. From this dataset, we utilize data on household size,
household earnings, and receipt of TANF and SNAP benefits over the year. We convert all
monetary values to 2017 dollars.
One issue is that benefit receipts are generally underreported in household surveys, includ-
ing the SIPP (Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan, 2015). To deal with this, we utilize data from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables, which
34An alternative approach to defining skills, employed by Katz and Murphy (1992) and Card (2009), is to
divide workers with some college between the two skill groups. We consider this skill classification in Appendix
D.3.
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report annual government spending on various U.S. programs. We multiply benefit receipt
amounts in the SIPP by a multiplicative constant such that the total population-weighted
benefit receipts in the SIPP are consistent with the aggregates from the NIPA tables.35
NLSY79 Our final data source is the NLSY79, a nationally representative panel dataset
with data on over 12,000 individuals. Respondents were first interviewed in the year 1979,
when respondents were between ages 14 and 22. The panel structure of the NLSY79 allows
us to observe an individual’s earnings over their life cycle, which determines an individual’s
social security benefit after retirement. Since we need data on as much of an individual’s work
history as possible, we drop individuals from our sample who drop out of the survey before
age 50.36 In addition to data on earnings, we utilize data on education, gender, marital status,
age, and number of children over the life cycle. We use these variables to map estimates of
earnings over the life cycle to individuals in the ACS.
4.3 Tax-Transfer System
Income Taxes and the EITC. To calculate marginal income and payroll tax rates, we
use NBER’s TAXSIM, a tax calculator that replicates the federal and state tax codes in a
given year, accounting for differential tax schedules and tax deductions and credits afforded by
various demographic groups, e.g. by marital status or number of dependents. Specifically, we
begin by calculating the total income for each household head and their spouse for all house-
holds in the ACS. We then use TAXSIM to calculate the marginal income and payroll taxes for
each individual, taking into account the individual’s marital status (which determines filing
status), number of children (a determinant in personal exemptions), age of children (a deter-
minant in eligibility of the Dependent Care Credit, the Child Credit, and the Earned Income
Tax Credit), location (which determines state income tax schedules), and age of the household
head and spouse (which determine eligibility for various deductions and exemptions).
The solid blue line in Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows the average marginal tax rate arising from
federal and state income taxes as a function of individual labor income. Panel (b) shows the
same relationship for participation tax rates. As can be seen both are increasing in income,
reflecting the progressivity of federal income tax schedule.37
35Specifically, we utilize data from NIPA Table 3.12. We multiply SNAP benefits in the SIPP by a constant
such they are consistent with SNAP benefits from this table and multiple TANF benefits in the SIPP by a
constant such they are consistent with “Family assistance” benefits from this table multiplied by the fraction
of TANF benefits which are spend on basic assistance.
36There are two complications in the NLSY that we need to deal with. First, we must deal with the fact
that individuals are only interviewed on even numbered years after 1994. We therefore assume that data in
odd numbered years post 1994 is the same as in the previous year. Further, in 2016, the last year from which
data are available, respondents are between age 53 and 60. We therefore do not have income information for
the last few years of individual’s working lives. We therefore assume that income for the remainder of the
working life is equal to a respondent’s last observed income.
37Appendix D.1 shows the total marginal and participation tax rates by individual earnings as the sum of
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Figure 2: Marginal and participation tax rates by individual earnings. Panel (a) gives the marginal effective
tax rates implied by income taxes, the social security system, and transfer programs. Panel (b) reports the
participation tax rates implied by income taxes, the social security system, and transfer programs. Income
taxes here are the sum of state and federal income taxes, social security is defined as payroll taxes minus the




Federal Income Tax 27.3 20.4
State Income Tax 4.9 4.1
Transfers
Food stamps (SNAP) 0.3 1.1
Welfare (TANF) 0.0 0.1
Social Security
Payroll Tax 10.4 13.9
SSI Payments -7.0 -11.9
Total 35.9 27.7
Table 2: Estimates of income weighted effective marginal tax rates. Each entry shows the income weighted
average marginal tax rates arising from each source of effective tax rates in our sample of ACS data. See text
for details.
Rows 1-2 of Table 2 give the income-weighted average marginal federal and state income
taxes for high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Consistent with the progressivity of these taxes,
we find marginal federal income tax rates of 27.3% for high-skilled workers and 20.4% for low-
skilled workers. State income tax systems are less progressive. We find marginal state income
tax rates of 4.9% and 4.1% for high- and low-skilled workers, respectively.
Welfare Programs. SNAP benefits are declining in income; in the phase-out region of
the SNAP benefit schedule, a dollar increase in monthly income is associated with a 24 cent
reduction in monthly SNAP benefits. Similarly, TANF benefits are determined as a function
of income, though the formula differs by state. However, take-up of these programs is far from
100% (Currie, 2006), and therefore the implied changes in the effective tax rates are less than
22
these statutory values suggest. Therefore, in order to estimate SNAP and TANF benefits
as a function income, while taking into account differences in eligibility and take-up across
households, we estimate realized benefits as a function of income and household characteristics
using data from the SIPP. Details on the procedure can be found in Appendix C.2.
The dashed green line in the left of Figure 2 gives the marginal phase-out rate of social
transfers, where social transfers are given by the sum of TANF and SNAP benefits. We can
see that the marginal phase-out rate of transfer payments is positive but small for low levels
of income before approaching 0 for higher income levels.38 The dashed green line in the right
panel of Figure 2 gives the social transfer phase-out associated with labor force participation,
which is also small and mostly decreasing as a function of income.
The income-weighted average marginal SNAP and TANF phase-out rates are shown in rows
3 and 4 in Table 2. The estimates of the average marginal phase-out rates of SNAP are small,
at 0.3% for high-skilled workers and 1.1% for low-skilled workers. This might seem surprising,
given that the phase out rate of SNAP for those who receive SNAP as a function of income is
quite large. However, the relevant statistic for the marginal effect of immigration is the average
income-weighted marginal benefit. To better see this, consider the average income weighted
phase-out rate of SNAP for households with four members. As with other demographic groups,
the phase-out rate for those on SNAP is 24%. However, given that take-up is less than 100%,
we estimate an average phase-out rate of only 15% for households whose income places them in
the phase-out region of the SNAP formula. Among four-member households, only households
with gross monthly income below $2,633 were eligible for SNAP. These households therefore
receive little weight when calculating the income weighted marginal phase-out rates.39
The estimates for TANF are even smaller— the average income weighted TANF benefits
0.1% for low-skilled workers and less than that for high-skilled workers. As with SNAP, TANF
recipients have low incomes and therefore receive little weight in the calculation of the income-
weighted average marginal phase-out rate. Furthermore, only 2.5 million individuals received
TANF in the average month in 2017.40 Therefore, while the marginal phase-out rates of TANF
and SNAP for a given individual can potentially be large, the income-weighted averages are
quite small.
38The fact that the phase-out rate is so low reflects the facts that 1) take-up of TANF and SNAP is less
than 100% and 2) the plot shows the phase-out as a function of individual’s earnings, holding spouses earnings
constant. Regarding 1), one reason could be that individuals “bank” their eligibility for the future since there
are are time limits in most states (Low, Meghir, Pistaferri, and Voena, 2018). Regarding 2): as TANF and
SNAP eligibility are generally determined by household income, many individuals would not be eligible for
these benefits even if their individual income dropped to 0.
39To get a better sense of the magnitude, note that 21.5% of individuals belonging to four-member house-
holds have an average monthly income less than $2,633. Further, the average household income conditional
on being above this threshold is over 7 times higher than the average household income conditional on be-
ing below this threshold. This implies that the average income weighted phase-out rate of households with
four members is well under 1%. A back of the envelope calculation yields an income weighted average of





Social Security. Finally, our calculation of effective marginal tax rates includes social secu-
rity benefits and payroll taxes. Payroll taxes are mostly decreasing with income; payroll taxes
have a constant marginal tax rate of 15.3% until the maximum taxable earnings threshold
after which the marginal rate drops to 2.9%.41
However, payroll taxes are not a pure tax because higher earnings are also associated with
higher social security benefits after retirement. More specifically, an individual’s social security
benefits are calculated as an increasing function of the individual’s average indexed monthly
earnings (AIME), the average monthly earnings over the individual’s 35 highest earnings years
of their career, adjusted for overall growth in the economy over time. Therefore, if current year
earnings are one of the individuals 35 highest earning years, an increase in current earnings
can increase an individual’s AIME and lead to a larger benefits payment after the individual
retires. As these social security payments will be received in the future, the relevant calculation
for our purposes is the discounted sum of the benefits.
In order to calculate how current income affects an individual’s social security benefits, we
need to know their AIME and their 35th highest year of earnings, which determines whether
current income enters the AIME calculation. These cannot be observed directly in the ACS,
which only contains data on an individual’s current income. We therefore first compute these
objects for each individual in our NLSY79 sample. We then impute an AIME and 35th highest
earning year for individuals in the ACS using similar individuals in the NLSY79.42 The AIME
is then used to determine the marginal rate of benefits associated with earnings and the 35th
highest year of earnings is used to determine if current earnings will affect the individual’s
AIME. Details on this procedure can be found in Appendix C.3. Finally, a crucial element
of this calculation is an individual’s life expectancy, which determines how many years the
individual receives benefits. To calculate life expectancy, we use estimates of life expectancy
conditional on income from Chetty et al. (2016), who estimate life expectancy for household
income percentiles using data from 1.4 billion tax and social security death records.43
The dotted green line in the two panels of Figure 2 display the marginal tax rates and
participation tax rates associated with the social security system, which we define as payroll
taxes minus the marginal replacement rates.44 At very low incomes, both marginal and par-
ticipation tax rates are very high. This occurs because very low income levels are unlikely to
be one of an individual’s 35 highest earning years, and therefore do not increase their future
social security benefits. Eventually, the social security tax begins to increase with income, as
higher earnings imply higher social security benefits post-retirement. At the maximum taxable
41The maximum taxable earnings threshold was $127,200 in the year 2017. At higher income levels, indi-
viduals must pay an Additional Medicare Tax, which increases the marginal tax rate by an additional 0.9%.
42More specifically, we calculate the mean AIME and 35th highest year of the earnings by gender, marital
status, education, age, and position in the income distribution for individuals in the NLSY79. We assign
individuals in the ACS their corresponding group mean of AIME and 35th highest earning year.
43We calculate each individuals household’s income percentile within their age. We then use the gender
specific life expectancy associated with this income percentile.
44Note that payroll taxes also fund other programs, such as Medicare, in addition to Social Security.
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earnings threshold of $127,200, the payroll tax drops precipitously, leading to a drop in the
marginal effective tax associated with social security.45 The social security participation tax
rate exhibits a kink, rather than a drop, at the maximum taxable earnings threshold, because
individuals still pay payroll taxes on earnings up to this threshold.
The 5th and 6th rows of Table 2 give the income weighted average payroll tax rates and
marginal discounted replacement rates. We find a higher marginal rate for low-skilled workers
than high-skilled workers, at 13.9% for low-skilled workers and 10.4% for high-skilled workers,
reflecting that payroll taxes drop dramatically at the maximum taxable earnings threshold.
We estimate an income weighted marginal social security replacement rate of 11.9% for low-
skilled workers and 7.0% for high-skilled workers, reflecting that marginal benefits rates are
decreasing in AIME. Taken together, this implies an income weighted average effective social
security tax of 2.0% for low-skilled and 3.4% for high-skilled workers.
The final row of Table 2 displays T̄ 0s and T̄ 0u, the income-weighted effective marginal tax
rates, as the sum of these elements. We obtain T̄ 0u = 27.7% for low-skilled workers and
T̄ 0s = 35.9% for high-skilled workers, implying a difference in marginal tax rates of 8.2%.
5 Results
We now present the quantification of our formula in Proposition 3. We then compare these
numbers to direct fiscal effects in Section 5.2 and also turn to welfare analysis in Section 5.3.
5.1 Indirect Fiscal Effects
Table 3 displays estimates for the indirect fiscal effect under different assumptions on the
elasticity of substitution between workers and labor supply elasticities. The three columns
show the indirect fiscal effect under different assumptions of the elasticity of substitution,
ranging from   = 1.5 to   = 2.5. Each row displays the results for different assumptions
about the labor supply elasticity.
In Panel I, we display the indirect fiscal effect with exogenous labor supply, based on
Proposition 2. We find indirect fiscal benefits of $1,299 (  = 1.5), $975 (  = 2), and $780
(  = 2.5).46
Next, in Panel II, we calculate the indirect fiscal effects when we allow for intensive, but not
extensive, margin adjustments. In all three scenarios, allowing for intensive margin adjust-
ments increases the indirect fiscal effect of low-skilled immigration. Panel III calculates the
indirect fiscal effects with extensive, but without intensive margin labor supply adjustments.
When elasticities are common or only vary by gender and marital status, the indirect fiscal
45After this threshold, the marginal tax rate is mostly flat, reflecting that further income increases do not
count for social security purposes.
46These results are slightly smaller than those in Section 2 because the model in that section multiplies tax




I. No Labor Supply Responses 1,299 975 780
II. Intensive Only
Common Elasticity 1,417 1,113 916
By Gender and Marital Status 1,303 979 784
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,347 1,015 815
III. Extensive Only
Common Elasticity 1,380 1,074 878
By Gender and Marital Status 1,335 1,020 826
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,268 965 779
IV. Intensive and Extensive
Common Elasticity 1,471 1,186 993
By Gender and Marital Status 1,339 1,025 830
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,313 1,004 813
Table 3: Indirect Fiscal Effects of low-skilled immigrants with intensive and extensive margin labor supply
responses. The three columns show the indirect fiscal effect under different assumptions of the elasticity
of substitution, ranging from   = 1.5 to   = 2.5. Each row displays the indirect fiscal effect for different
assumptions about the labor supply elasticity.
effect is larger than the case with no labor supply responses. However, when extensive margin
elasticities can vary by income, gender and marital status, the indirect effect decreases slightly
because extensive margin elasticities are generally decreasing in income.
Finally, Panel IV displays the results with both intensive and extensive labor supply adjust-
ments. When labor supply elasticities are common across gender, marital status and income,
we find indirect fiscal benefits of $1,471 (  = 1.5), $1,186 (  = 2), and $993 (  = 2.5).
Tables 14 and 15 in Appendix D.4 repeat the analysis for the average high school dropout
immigrant and the average high school graduate immigrant. From (3) we can see that the
income of the immigrant only enters as a multiplicative constant, therefore, the indirect fiscal
effects associated with high school dropouts (graduates) can easily be calculated by multiplying
the effects in Table 3 by the ratio of income of the immigrant high school dropouts (graduates)
over the income of all low-skilled immigrants. As such, the indirect fiscal effects for high school
dropouts are roughly 15% smaller than those for all low-skilled immigrants and range from
$660 to $1,220 while the indirect fiscal effects for high school graduates are roughly 10% larger
than those for all low-skilled immigrants and range from $860 to $1,620.
5.2 Relation to Direct Fiscal Effects
We now relate our results about the indirect fiscal effects to the direct fiscal effects of the
report by the National Academy of Sciences (2017).
Our approach is as follows: we first consider the lifetime direct fiscal effect of a low-skilled
immigrant who arrives at age 23 and lives until the age of 79. We choose 23 since this is the
median age of arrival for low-skilled immigrants in the ACS and we chose 79 years because
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the life expectancy at age 23 in the U.S. is roughly 79.47 We make use of Figure 8-21 of
the NAS report, which provides us with the net direct fiscal impact by age for both high
school graduates and high school dropouts. These calculations account for the immigrant’s
federal, state and local taxes, incarceration costs, veteran’s benefits, refugee support costs,
government healthcare costs, and a variety of federal and state level transfer programs over
an individual’s life-cycle.48 Further, we need to make an assumption about how immigrants
affect government spending on public goods.49 We consider four different scenarios, similar
to the NAS report: (i) there are zero marginal costs of public goods and hence no costs are
assigned to immigrants, (ii) marginal costs are equal to 25% the average costs of public goods,
(iii) marginal costs are equal to 50% of average costs, and (iv) marginal costs equal average
costs.50 For all of these four scenarios, we can calculate the net present value (NPV) direct
fiscal effect of low-skilled immigrants. To make this number comparable to our annual indirect
fiscal effect, we calculate the annuity value for the period of 23 until 65 (labor market period)
that corresponds to the NPV of the lifetime direct fiscal effect.
Table 4 contains these annuitized values for the four different scenarios. The first column
gives the results for a high school dropout immigrant, the next column gives the results for high
school graduates, and the last column gives the results for the average low-skilled immigrant.
We can clearly see that low-skilled immigrants imply a direct fiscal burden in nearly every
scenario – only high school graduates are a small fiscal surplus for the first scenario. Recall
that we calculate indirect fiscal effects of $660 to $1220 for high school dropouts and $860
to $1620 for high school graduates. Accounting for these indirect effects in scenarios (ii) and
(iii) can turn high school graduates from a fiscal burden into a small fiscal surplus. More
generally, comparing the numbers in Table 4 with the numbers in Table 3, one can see that
indirect fiscal effects are economically meaningful in comparison to the direct fiscal effects and
should therefore be taken into account.
5.3 Welfare Effects
Table 5 summarizes the welfare effects associated with the distributional effects and the in-
direct fiscal effects of immigration as formalized in Proposition 4. In the first three columns,
we calculate the welfare effects using the welfare weights of Hendren (2020), where the utility
of all natives, both domestic-born and foreign-born, are considered. Given the intermediate
47In 2017, the life expectancy at age 23 was 77.06 for men and 81.72 for women. This yields a simple
average of 79.39. Source: https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html
48National Academy of Sciences (2017) also accounts for schooling costs, but these are less relevant here
given that we consider low-skilled immigrants from age 23 onwards.
49Dustmann and Frattini (2014) give a detailed discussion about this for the UK and point out that the
exact specification matters significantly. Referring to assumptions on the marginal cost of public goods, the
NAS report states “In fact, such assumptions are likely to swamp the impact of most of the other assumptions
and data issues that arise in fiscal impact analyses.” (National Academy of Sciences, 2017, p. 266).
50Case (i) relates to scenario 6 and case (iv) relates to scenario 2 of Box 8-1 of National Academy of Sciences
(2017). Cases (ii) and (iii) are intermediate cases of those two.
27
Public Goods High School High School
Scenario Dropout Graduate Average
Zero Marginal Costs -4,151 695 -1,388
MC = 0.25 ⇥ AC -4,922 -86 -2,165
MC = 0.5 ⇥ AC -5,693 -867 -2,942
MC = AC -7,235 -2,429 -4,496
Table 4: Annuitized direct fiscal effect of an immigrant that arrives at age 23 and dies at age 79. We use
a discount rate of 1%. Only direct fiscal contributions are accounted for and rely on Figure 8-21 of National
Academy of Sciences (2017). We calculate the annuity value for the period of 23 until 65 (age of retirement).
value of   = 2, quantification of the formula in Proposition 4 reveals a distributional effect
of -$1,318. This formalizes the idea that the increase in inequality associated with low-skilled
immigration can entail significant welfare costs. The magnitude of this distributional effect is
sensitive to how the social welfare weights differ with income: here we use the welfare weights
of Hendren (2020), which are the welfare weights implicitly used by the U.S. government.51
However, this distributional effect is partially offset by the two welfare effects related to
indirect fiscal effects: the fiscal externalities associated with changes in native labor supply and
the tax mitigation effect. Evaluating (11) with common labor supply elasticities and   = 2,
we find a fiscal externality of $430, roughly one third of the entire indirect fiscal effect.52
The distributional effect is further mitigated by the fact that the tax burden for low-skilled
natives decreases while the tax burden for high-skilled natives increases. This tax mitigation
effect creates an additional surplus of $511. Therefore, the two novel welfare effects associated
with the indirect fiscal effect — the fiscal externality and the tax mitigation effect — imply
an additional, so far neglected, surplus of $941. All together, this implies a welfare effect
beyond the direct fiscal effect of -$377 compared to a pure distributional effect of -$1,318. An
implication is that low-skilled immigration would be welfare improving only if immigrants had
a positive direct fiscal effect above $377. This could for example be achieved by accordingly
set visa fees.
In the last three columns, we calculate the effects on domestic-born welfare by only assigning
non-zero welfare weights to domestic-born individuals.53 The distributional effects are slightly
muted as domestic-born are more likely to be skilled than previous immigrants. For   = 2,
we find a distributional effect for domestic-born of -$932. This implies a welfare effect beyond
the direct fiscal effect of -$77.
51Note that generally, the weights that Hendren (2020) obtained, depend on his calibration of the income
distribution, the tax-transfer system calibration and the elasticities, which is not the same calibration for
these objects as in our paper. We consider it as a reasonably good approximation to work with his weights,
in particular because the welfare results are not the main results of this paper. The weights of Lockwood and
Weinzierl (2016) are very similar, who study how welfare weights implicitly used by the U.S. government have
changed over time.
52Note that holding labor supply elasticities constant, the fiscal externality is the same fraction of the
indirect fiscal effect for any value of the elasticity of substitution,  . Therefore, the result that the fiscal
externality is over one third of the fiscal surplus is true for any value of the elasticity of substitution.
53We again utilize the use the welfare weights of Hendren (2020) and set the weights for foreign-born
individuals to zero. We then we normalize the welfare weights such that are equal to one on average.
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All Natives Domestic-Born Only
1.5 2.0 2.5 1.5 2.0 2.5
I. Distributional Effect -1634 -1318 -1104 -1157 -932 -781
II. Fiscal Externality 533 430 360 533 430 360
III. Tax Mitigation 633 511 428 527 425 356
Total Effect (Absent Direct Fiscal Effect) -468 -377 -316 -96 -77 -65
Table 5: Welfare effects of low-skilled immigrants absent direct fiscal effects. The right panel displays the
welfare effects when only domestic-born natives receive positive social welfare weights. Within each panel,
the three columns show the indirect fiscal effect under different assumptions of the elasticity of substitution,
ranging from   = 1.5 to   = 2.5 with common labor supply elasticities.
Overall, these welfare effects of natives are rather small in magnitude compared to es-
timates of wage gains that low-skilled immigrants experience as a result of coming to the
United States. Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) find that U.S. immigrants from
the countries in their sample have 200% to 1500% higher wages than observably identical
individuals who remain in their home country. For a low-skilled Mexican male immigrant,
this implies an income gain of nearly $20,000 annually.54 Hendricks and Schoellman (2018)
find that immigrants from low- and middle-income countries increase their wages by 200% to
300% upon arriving in the United States. This suggests that the overall welfare effects are
likely to be positive if the welfare of the immigrants themselves are accounted for.
6 Extensions and Robustness
We now discuss the sensitivity of our results to several alternative model specifications. The
formulas for indirect fiscal effects and additional details and results for each specification
are included in Appendix A. We summarize the results from these extensions in Table 1.
Apart from Section 6.3, we consider exogenous labor supply of natives in these extensions.
Generalizing the integral equation approach used in the benchmark model to also account for
endogenous labor supply in these settings would be relatively straightforward.
6.1 Alternative Skill Stratifications
So far we assumed that all workers within a given skill group are perfectly substitutable.
We now consider three different skill stratifications and production functions that have been
utilized in the immigration literature. First, we evaluate the indirect fiscal effects using the
model and estimates from Borjas (2003), who considers a nested-CES production function in
which narrower education groups and experience levels are imperfect substitutes. We find that
the average low-skilled immigrant leads to an indirect fiscal effect of $1,873 in this context. The
54The average low-skilled male Mexican immigrant in our dataset has an average wage income of $32,841.
Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) estimate that Mexican immigrants have wages 2.53 times higher
than observably identical Mexicans who do not immigrate. We calculate the average income gain as 32, 841 
32,841
2.53 = 19, 860.
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main reason why the effect is higher than in our main model is that Borjas (2003) estimates
a lower value for the elasticity of substitution between different education groups.55
Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013) argue than an immigrant’s education level might
give an inaccurate approximation of a worker’s skills, given that skills are often not trans-
ferable. They propose a skill classification in which a worker’s skill is given by her position
in the wage distribution. Therefore, immigrants at a given position in the wage distribution
compete with natives at the same position of the wage distribution, regardless of their educa-
tion levels.56 We calculate an indirect fiscal effect of low-skilled immigrants of $1,017 in this
setting.57
6.2 Domestic- and Foreign-Born Complementarity
Next, we consider the model considered in Ottaviano and Peri (2012), which allows for
domestic- and foreign-born workers to be imperfectly substitutable within education and expe-
rience groups. The production function takes a similar structure to that in Borjas (2003) but
has two important differences. First, instead of assuming all four education groups aggregate
within a single CES aggregator, we now follow Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and instead use a
two level nested structure to model complementarity between education groups. High school
dropouts and high school graduates aggregate to low-skilled labor and individuals with some
college and college graduates aggregate to high-skilled labor. This specification allows for one
elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled workers and a second elasticity of
substitution between narrow education groups. Second, within each skill-education-experience
group, we allow for the possibility that domestic- and foreign-born workers may be imperfectly
substitutable in production.58 Using the estimates from Ottaviano and Peri (2012), we find
an indirect fiscal effect of $1,065.59
While the indirect fiscal effects are similar to those above, the results on welfare can be quite
different in this model. We find a distributional effect arising from an increase in inequality
of -$1,989, about one third of which is mitigated by progressive taxes. However, if we only
focus on the welfare of domestic-born natives, we find a positive distributional effect of $742.
Therefore, as emphasized by Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler (2016) and Ottaviano and
Peri (2012), the inclusion of domestic-foreign complementarity in the production function has
strong implications for which workers bear the incidence of low-skilled immigrant inflows.60
55We give the detail of the model and quantification in Appendix A.1. We also decompose the indirect
effects into those arising from relative wages across experience groups and across education groups.
56This is similar to the production function utilized in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017), which
combines labor from a continuum of skill types.
57Details on this specification are included in Appendix A.3.
58We focus on “Model B” from Ottaviano and Peri (2012), which the authors show is the most consistent
with the data. We use their estimates from column 7 of Table 6.
59Appendix A.2 presents the full specification and quantification.
60Allowing for domestic-foreign complementarity implies that low-skilled foreign born workers who immi-
grated in the past experience the largest wages decreases as a result of new low-skilled immigrant inflows,
while low-skilled domestic-born workers only experience small wage decreases or even wage increases.
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However, domestic-foreign born complementary does not play a first-order role in determining
the indirect fiscal effect of immigration. In fact, the indirect fiscal benefits calculated using
the production function in Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and the production function in Borjas
(2003) are quite similar if we use comparable estimates of the elasticity of substitution be-
tween education groups, see the last paragraphs of Appendices A.1, A.2 and A.3, respectively.
Therefore, while the welfare implications differ across the two models, the implied indirect
fiscal effects are similar.
6.3 Endogenous Occupation Choice
Next, we consider the model of immigration and the labor market developed by Peri and
Sparber (2009).61 In this framework, low-skilled domestic-born workers differ from low-skilled
foreign-born workers in that they choose different occupations due to different comparative
advantages. Low-skilled foreign-born workers tend to choose occupations with a high man-
ual task and lower communication task intensity than low-skilled natives. Since manual tasks
and communication tasks are complementary in production, low-skilled domestic-born workers
and low-skilled foreign-born workers are now imperfect substitutes.62 Additionally, occupation
choices are endogenous and therefore low-skilled workers may respond to low-skilled immigra-
tion by changing to more communication-intensive occupations.
We take the estimates of production parameters and occupation choice elasticities from
Peri and Sparber (2009) to calculate the indirect fiscal effect. First, we calculate the indirect
fiscal effects under the assumption that natives do not adjust their occupation in response to
immigration. In this case, we find a indirect fiscal effect of $1,115, which is in a similar ballpark
as the numbers we found in Section 5. However, with endogenous occupation choice, low-
skilled domestic-born workers respond by switching into higher-paying occupations, thereby
increasing their incomes and thus tax payments.63 Therefore, when we allow for endogenous
occupation choice, we find an indirect fiscal effect of $2,131.
6.4 Decreasing Returns to Scale
With decreasing returns to scale, an immigrant inflow can lead to changes in firm profits in
addition to changes in wages. Therefore, the indirect fiscal effects arise not only because of a
change in relative incomes of high-skilled and low-skilled workers but also from an increase in
firm profits relative to worker income. In Appendix A.5, we show that this additional effect
can be accommodated into our indirect fiscal effect formulas with a term that captures the
increase in profit taxes at the cost of a decrease in labor income taxes.
61The details of this specification are given in Appendix A.4.
62In essence, the differences in task concentration between domestic- and foreign-born workers provide a
microfoundation for the domestic- and foreign-born complementarity in Ottaviano and Peri (2012).
63Note that this effect constitutes a fiscal externality. This fiscal externality is much larger than the fiscal
externality resulting from hours worked and participation responses in the canonical model.
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To evaluate indirect fiscal effects with decreasing returns to scale, we utilize estimates of
returns to scale from Burnside (1996) and estimate the tax rate on profits arising from both
corporations and pass-through businesses. We find an indirect fiscal effect of $1,057.
6.5 Further Potential Extensions
Endogenous Education Low-skilled natives may respond to low-skilled immigrant inflows
by further investing in their education (Llull, 2018). This would likely increase the indirect
fiscal effects of immigration as increased education leads to increased lifetime income and
therefore increased tax payments. As shown in Colas, Findeisen, and Sachs (2021), this fiscal
externality associated with attending college is quantitatively important.64
Monopsonistic Labor Markets Amior and Manning (2020) emphasize that most of the
immigration literature rests on the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets. They
argue that this assumption is problematic because markdowns on wages in a setting with
monopsony power are likely to be endogenous to immigration since labor supply of immigrants
tends to be relatively inelastic.65 In this case, low-skilled immigration would not only imply
redistribution from low- to high-skilled workers but also from workers to firms, similar to the
decreasing-returns to scale extension in Section 6.4. An important difference to Section 6.4
is that immigrants are not paid their marginal product in such a setting. This implies that
the economic pie accruing to natives would increase and thereby reinforce the indirect fiscal
benefit.
Search Frictions We have abstracted from search frictions in the labor market. As as been
pointed out by Battisti, Felbermayr, Peri, and Poutvaara (2018) immigration can attenuate
search frictions on the labor market, which also implies indirect fiscal benefits.
Native Migration Responses Low-skilled immigrant inflows into a given city can induce
migration responses by natives (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997; Piyapromdee, 2020; Monras,
2020). These native migration responses, either in the form of outflows of low-skilled or inflows
of high-skilled natives, would mitigate the effect of immigration on local wage inequality and
therefore reduce the indirect fiscal effect generated locally, but would increase wage inequality
and therefore generate indirect fiscal effects in other cities. Concretely, if the economy consists
of J cities with different population sizes but that are otherwise identical, the total indirect
fiscal effect generated across all cities would be independent of the distribution of the low-
skilled immigrants across cities and of any native migration responses.66 However, if cities
64Colas, Findeisen, and Sachs (2021) estimate average lifetime fiscal externalities of attending college rang-
ing roughly $60,000 to $90,000, conditional on parental income.
65For the US, the authors show that the assumption that markdowns are exogenous is rejected by the data.
66This is because the indirect fiscal effect is independent of the size of the native population. See also the
discussion in Foonote 17.
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differ in their wage levels, a native’s income and tax payments will depend on their location
and therefore native migration will imply a fiscal externality. These effects could be jointly
analyzed using a spatial equilibrium model with taxes, such as in Colas and Hutchinson (2021).
7 Discussion
In this section we discuss additional issues and address limitations of our analysis. First, in
Section 7.1 we discuss the role of physical capital. In Section 7.2, we discuss some critical
issues about the assumptions we made when estimating the indirect fiscal effect.
7.1 The Role of Physical Capital
We have abstracted away from the role of capital in production. Here we show how physical
capital can be accommodated into our formulas. This does not significantly change our results.
Elastically Supplied Physical Capital Consider a constant returns production function
Y = F (Lu,Ls, K) that uses physical capital, K, as an input in addition to low- and high-
skilled labor. Since the supply of capital is perfectly elastic and since F (·) exhibits constant
returns to scale, the firm’s optimal choice of capital level can be written as a function of the
levels of high- and low-skilled labor, K? (Ls,Lu). Therefore, one can redefine production in
terms of labor quantities given the endogenous capital level as
F̃ (Lu,Ls) = F (Lu,Ls, K
? (Ls,Lu)).
Note that F̃ is a function of only labor quantities and exhibits constant returns to scale.
Therefore, Proposition 3 can still be applied if we interpret the own-wage elasticity  own as
the wage elasticity given optimal capital adjustments.67 As a simple example, consider the case
with the Cobb-Douglas production function F (Lu,Ls, K) = K↵ (G (Lu,Ls))1 ↵, where G (·)
is a CRS labor aggregate. With elastic capital supply, the ratio of capital to the labor aggregate
is constant. Therefore, we can rewrite the production function as F̃ (Lu,Ls) = ĀG (Lu,Ls)
where Ā is a positive multiplicative constant, see Appendix B.7.
In addition, low-skilled immigration will lead to an increase in physical capital which may
lead to increased tax revenue.
Inelastically Supplied Physical Capital Lewis (2011) argues that capital stocks adjust
quickly to immigrant inflows, and therefore the case with elastic capital supply is appropriate
for most settings. Yet, it is interesting to get a sense of how our results would change if capital
67Note that the above does not rely on a particular production function (such as Cobb-Douglas) or sepa-
rability of capital in the production function more generally. The above arguments also apply to cases with
non-separable capital and capital-skill complementarity, as in the models in Lewis (2011) and Lewis (2013).
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supply is inelastic. Consider again the Cobb-Douglas production function that combines
physical capital, K, with a labor aggregate G
Y = K↵G (Lu,Ls)
1 ↵ ,
where ↵ 2 (0, 1) is a parameter and G is a constant returns to scale function. We assume
capital is supplied inelastically and capital payments are taxed at rate ⌧k.
As we show in Appendix B.7, the indirect fiscal benefit with inelastic labor supply for an
immigrant of type i is given by
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is the own-wage elasticity of low-skilled labor when capital supply is
perfectly elastic.68 Therefore, the indirect fiscal effect generated by the “skill ratio effect” is
simply equal to the indirect fiscal effect with elastic capital supply. One reasonable assumption
is that when physical capital supply is inelastic, returns to physical capital have a similar tax
rate as firm profits. Therefore using the marginal tax rate for profit we calculated of 36.8%
in the previous section, and capital share parameter of ↵ = .33, we find that the indirect
fiscal effect of an average low-skilled immigrant with inelastic capital supply will increase by
yi↵
 
⌧k   T̄ 0I
 
= $273 compared to the case with elastic capital supply.
7.2 Further Issues
Steady State versus Dynamics In all our specifications, we have focused on a steady
state interpretation and have abstracted from the fact that it may take some time until the
economy reaches the new steady state after the arrival of the immigrants.69 It would certainly
be possible to extend our approach numerically to such more dynamic settings and discuss
how the indirect fiscal effects differ in the short run. One can, however, interpret our results
with exogenous labor supply as fiscal effects that apply in the short run and the results with
endogenous labor supply as the fiscal effects that apply in the long run. As can be see in
Table 3, short and long-run effects are rather similar.
More structural approaches have been taken in the literature more recently, e.g. by Llull
(2018) who considers endogenous responses of workers along the occupation and education
margin, by Bound, Braga, Golden, and Khanna (2015) who consider major and occupation
choice responses of skilled natives, by Monras (2020) who considers a dynamic spatial equi-
librium model, and by Colas (2019) who also considers sectoral choices of natives.
68This is also equal to the own-wage elasticity when ↵ = 0.
69See, for example, Card (1990), Cohen-Goldner and Paserman (2011), Llull (2017), Monras (2020), Borjas
(2015) and Edo (2017) for reduced-form evidence comparing the short- and long-run wage impacts.
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Documented versus Undocumented Immigration In our analysis we have not explic-
itly made the distinction between authorized and undocumented immigrants. This distinction
would matter for the calculation of the indirect fiscal effect because undocumented immi-
grants differ in their eligibility status for welfare programs and their likelihood to pay income
or payroll taxes.70 However, we focus on the indirect fiscal effect, which operates through
a low-skilled immigrant’s effect on native wages, independent of the taxes paid and benefits
received by the immigrant themselves. As such, an immigrant’s documentation status is un-
likely to have a first-order effect on their indirect fiscal effect conditional on their income level
yi.71
Other Indirect Effects Immigrants may have indirect fiscal effects on top of those de-
scribed in this paper. We have focused on a single consumption good and therefore abstracted
from how immigrants may affect tax revenue by changing relative consumption prices. For
example, it has been shown that low-skilled immigration lowers prices for low-skilled services
such as gardening or housekeeping (Cortes, 2008). Such effects would only matter if the goods
or services whose relative prices increase is taxed at a different rate then the goods for which
the relative prices decrease. An effect that probably matters more is the interaction between
the prices for these services and native labor supply. Cortes and Tessada (2011) show that
high-skilled female native labor supply increased due low-skilled immigration and, consistently
with that, these women have reduced their time spent on household work. Additionally, im-
migration may increase local housing prices and rents (Saiz, 2003, 2007) and therefore lead to
additional fiscal effects arising from property taxes and taxes on rental income.
Local Taxes versus Federal Taxes We have accounted in detail for how taxes paid and
transfers received vary with income to obtain reliable estimates for income-weighted averages
of marginal tax rates for the different income groups. We have not accounted for the fact that
some taxes are raised at the state level and some at the federal level. Similarly, some transfers
are paid by the states and some by the federal government. We have therefore taken a national
perspective on public finances. We leave the issue of how the fiscal effect is distributed between
different levels of government for future research.
Larger Immigrant Inflows We have focused on small inflows of immigrants and therefore
considered first-order approximations throughout, thus allowing for a transparent analytical
approach. For larger inflows of immigrants, these first-order approximations would become less
70The National Academy of Sciences (2017) summarize the literature on the fiscal effects of undocumented
immigrants as finding that undocumented immigrants tend to have a more positive impact than documented
immigrants, largely due to the fact that undocumented immigrants tend to be younger. Undocumented
immigrants are also ineligible for medical coverage under the Affordable Care Act and are ineligible for the
Earned Income Tax Credit, among other programs.
71As undocumented immigrants on average have lower income than authorized immigrants, they will have
on average a lower indirect fiscal effect because the indirect fiscal effect is increasing in the immigrant’s income.
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appropriate. It would be straightforward to consider larger immigration inflows numerically
and thereby go beyond first-order approximations.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the indirect fiscal effect of immigration that works through the
impact on the native wages and labor supply. Applying these formulas to the U.S., we find
that the indirect fiscal effects of low-skilled immigration are sizable and positive. For some
plausible scenario they turn low-skilled immigration from a fiscal burden to a fiscal surplus.
Future work could extend our analysis to other countries, where the tax system, labor supply
responses and wage effects of immigration may differ from the U.S. case. Our approach could
also be extended to calculate the indirect fiscal effects of high-skilled immigrants. In thinking
about the indirect effects of high-skilled immigration, it would seem natural to allow for high-
skilled immigrants to affect factor productivity, in addition to factor ratios (Kerr and Lincoln,
2010; Peri, Shih, and Sparber, 2015; Bound, Khanna, and Morales, 2017; Khanna and Lee,
2018). We leave these extensions for future research.
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Appendix for Online Publication
A Extensions Appendix
In this Appendix, we evaluate the indirect fiscal effects using several alternative model specifi-
cations. Appendices A.1 through A.3 consider alternative production functions utilized in the
immigration literature. As we focus on differences in production functions, we consider the
case with exogenous native labor supply. Appendix A.4 considers the case when workers can
endogenously choose their supply of communication- and manual-intensive tasks. Appendix
A.5 considers the case with decreasing returns to scale. For the sake of readability, we have
relegated most proofs to Appendix B.
A.1 Imperfectly Substitutable Education and Experience
In this Appendix, we evaluate the indirect fiscal effects using the model from Borjas (2003).
Production takes the form of a two-level nested CES function.72 The top level of the production
function combines labor supplies of four education groups: high school dropouts, high school













where Le is the labor aggregate of labor of education group e,  E is the elasticity of sub-
stitution between education groups, and ✓e is a factor-intensity parameter. Due to this finer
stratification of skill groups, an increase in the number of high school dropouts, for example,
affects the relative wages of dropouts to high school graduates, in addition to the relative
wages of high-skilled versus low-skilled workers.
In turn, each education-specific labor aggregate is itself an aggregator of experience levels
within a given education group. As in Borjas (2003), we divide workers into 8 experience
levels consisting of 5-year experience intervals, starting with 1-5 years experience until 36-40











where Lae gives the labor supply of a given experience-education group and is given by
Lae =
R
Iae Li!idi, and where Iae is the set of types within a given experience-education
group. The parameter  X is equal to the elasticity of substitution of experience levels within
the same education group and ✓ae is a factor-intensity parameter. Therefore, within the
72We abstract away from physical capital (or alternatively assume that capital supply is perfectly elastic)
in Sections A.1 through A.5. We discuss the role of capital in Section 7.1.
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Education Average 1,932 1,834
Overall Average 1,873
Table 6: Indirect Fiscal Effects using model from Borjas (2003). Each entry gives the indirect fiscal effect
associated with a worker in each narrow education and experience group. The “Education Average” gives the
weighted average indirect fiscal effect within each education group and the “Overall Average” is the weighted
average across all groups.
same education level, workers of different experience levels are imperfectly substitutable in
production. Immigrant inflows therefore change the relative wages of different experience
groups within the same education level.
As we show in Appendix B.3, if labor supply is inelastic, the indirect fiscal benefit of an
immigrant of type i in experience group a and education group e is given by
















where  ̃ae,own is the own-wage elasticity of experience group a and education group e, holding
the overall ratio of education groups constant, T̄ 0a0 6=a,e is the income weighted average tax rate
of all other experience groups in education group e, T̄ 0e0 6=e is the income weighted tax rate
of all other education groups,  e,own is the own-wage elasticity of education group e, where
the wage of an education group is defined as @Y@Le . Therefore, we can decompose the indirect
fiscal effect into two separate effects. The first effect, which we label the “experience effect”
comes from the fact that an immigrant inflow of experience group a increases the supply of
experience group a relative to all other experience groups within education group e. The
“education effect” captures that the immigrant inflow also increases the ratio of labor from
education group e relative to all other education groups.
Results Following Borjas (2003), we set  X = 3.5 and set  E = 1.3. The indirect fiscal
effect associated with a worker in each of the experience groups for both high school dropouts
and high school graduates are given in Table 6. The first column gives the indirect fiscal effect
associated with high school dropouts and the second column gives the effect associated with
high school graduates. The fiscal effect of both education levels is increasing in experience
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level, reflecting that incomes are increasing in experience. Across all experience groups, the
average high school dropout is associated with a $1,932 indirect fiscal benefit and the high
school graduate with a $1,834 indirect fiscal benefit. The average low-skilled immigrant across
education groups leads to a fiscal benefit of $1,873.
To better understand why the indirect fiscal effect here is larger than in the previous
sections, we now perform several alternative calculations. First, to understand the role of the
“experience effect”, we calculate the indirect fiscal benefit when experience groups are perfect
substitutes within education, by setting 1 X = 0. This has only a slight effect on the indirect
fiscal effect: the average indirect fiscal effect increases from $1,873 in the baseline case to $1,892
in the case when experience groups are perfect substitutes within education group. Next, to
understand the role of the elasticity of substitution parameter, we calculate the indirect fiscal
benefit under the assumption that the elasticity of substitution is equal to 2 by setting  E = 2.
This reduces the average fiscal benefit to $1,230, similar in magnitude to the effect we found
in Section 3. Therefore, despite the key differences between the production function here and
that presented in Section 3, both production functions lead to similar estimates of the indirect
fiscal effect of low-skilled immigration, once we use comparable parameter estimates.
A.2 Domestic-Born and Foreign-Born Complementarity
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) consider a model in which domestic- and foreign-born workers
are imperfect substitutes within education and experience groups. Ultimately the production
function takes the form of a four-level nested CES labor aggregate function, with a top nest
corresponding to skill groups (high skill and low skill), a second nest corresponding with educa-
tion groups within these two skill groups (high school graduate and dropout within low-skilled
workers, some college and college graduate within high-skilled), a third nest corresponding
with 8 experience groups within each education group, and a final nest aggregating domestic-
and foreign-born workers.73
Specifically, the top nest of the production functions combines a high-skilled labor aggregate













Ls aggregates some college and college graduate labor while Lu aggregates high school dropout
and high school graduate labor. Let e1, e2, e3, and e4 denote high school dropout, high school












73We focus on “Model B” from Ottaviano and Peri (2012), which the authors show is the most consistent




























for e 2 {e1, e2, e3, e4}. Finally, each of the education, experience labor aggregates, Lae com-
























for high-skilled labor (e 2 {e3, e4}). Laen gives the labor supply of a given education-
experience-nativity group (n 2 {d, f}) and is given by Laen =
R
Iaen Li!idi, and where Iaen is
the set of types i within a given education-experience-nativity group.
The indirect fiscal benefit of an immigrant of type i in experience group a0 and education
group e0 is given by
dRind (a













where ȳaen is the average income of workers of experience group a, education group e, and






is the elasticity of wages of workers of experience group a and education
e and nativity n with respect to labor supply of foreign-born workers of experience group a0
and education e0. We refrain from further simplifying the formula in this case.
Results We quantify the model using parameters estimates from Ottaviano and Peri (2012).
Table 7 gives the indirect fiscal effect associated with an immigrant with average income in
each experience group for both high school dropouts and high school graduates. The average
high school dropout immigrant leads to an indirect fiscal benefit of $920 while the average high
school graduate immigrant leads to an indirect fiscal benefit of $1,161. Taken together, this
implies the average low-skilled immigrant leads to an average indirect fiscal effect of $1,065.
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Education Average 920 1,161
Overall Average 1,065
Table 7: Indirect Fiscal Effects using model from Ottaviano and Peri (2012). Each entry gives the indirect
fiscal effect associated with a worker in each narrow education and experience group. The “Education Average”
gives the weighted average indirect fiscal effect within each education group and the “Overall Average” is the
weighted average across all groups. We focus on “Model B” from Ottaviano and Peri (2012), which the authors
show is the most consistent with the data. We use estimates from column 7 of Table 6, which gives an elasticity
of substitution between skill levels of 1.85.
To better understand the implications of the nesting structure on the indirect fiscal effects,
we sequentially recalculate the indirect fiscal effects under the assumptions that labor supplies
in each of the CES nests are perfectly substitutable. First, we assume domestic- and foreign-
born workers within experience-education-skill groups are perfect substitutes. This leads to a
fiscal benefit of $1,057. Next, we additionally assume workers of difference experience groups
within the same education level are perfect substitutes. This implies a fiscal benefit of $1,065.
Finally, we remove imperfect substitutability between narrow education groups. This model
now shares the same structure as the model presented in Section 3, as all workers within the
two skill groups are perfectly substitutable. In this case the indirect fiscal benefit is $1,059.
A.3 Skills Defined by Position in Wage Distribution
In this Appendix, we calculate the indirect fiscal effects using the model presented in Dustmann
et al. (2013), which a worker’s skill is given by her position in the wage distribution. Let total












where Lj gives the labor supply of a given skill group, and skill groups are defined by position
in the wage distribution (for example percentiles or deciles). Formally, Lj is given by Lj =R
Ij Li!idi, where Ij is the set of workers types within skill group j. The parameter   gives
the elasticity of substitution between skill groups and each ✓j parameter measures the factor
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Table 8: Indirect Fiscal Effects using model from Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013). The second
columns gives the indirect fiscal effect for an immigrant in each decile of the wage distribution. The right
column gives the percent of total low-skilled immigrants in each wage decile. The bottom row gives the
weighted average of the indirect fiscal effects across the wage distribution.
intensity of skill type j. As we show in Appendix B.4, the indirect fiscal benefit associated
with an immigrant of type i in skill group j is given by
dRDFPind (j, i) = yi ⇥ | j,own|⇥
 
T̄ 0k 6=j   T̄j
 
,
where yi is the income level of workers of type i, T̄ 0k 6=j is the income weighted average marginal
tax rate of all other groups k 6= j, and T̄ 0j is the income weighted average marginal tax rate
income group j. Given the CES production function, the own-wage elasticity has the simple
expression 1 j  , where j is the income share of workers in skill group j.
Results We define skill groups using deciles of the wage distribution.74 The results are
not sensitive to the grouping of j. We use our central value for the elasticity of substitution
between skill groups and set   = 2.75 Table 8 gives the indirect fiscal effect associated with
the average immigrant of each decile of the wage distribution. The indirect fiscal effect is
increasing in wage decile up until the 5th decile, reflecting the fact that income is increasing
in the wage decile. Starting with the 6th decile, the indirect fiscal benefit decreases as the
average marginal tax rates increase relative to the average marginal tax rates of other groups.
The weighted average indirect fiscal effect is $1,017, similar to the fiscal effect found in Section
3 when we set   = 2.
74We calculate wages as total wage and self-employment income divided by weeks worked and average hours
worked. In the 2017 ACS, weeks worked are intervalled, we use the midpoint of the interval.
75Using data from the UK, Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013) find that an elasticity of substitution
between skill group of 0.6 fits their reduced form evidence best. Using this value as the elasticity of substitution
yields and an average indirect fiscal benefit of low-skilled immigrants of $2,766. We believe the value of   = 2
to be more appropriate for the US context.
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A.4 Endogenous Occupational Choice of Natives
In this Appendix, we evaluate the indirect fiscal effects in a model with endogenous occupation
choice, as in Peri and Sparber (2009). Perfectly competitive firms produce a numeraire output
good using cognitive, communication and manual tasks. Cognitive tasks are supplied by high-
skilled individuals. Communication and manual tasks are performed by low-skilled individuals.
Denote by M total manual task supply and by C total communication task supply. In the
bottom nest of the production function, these tasks combine to form the aggregate of low-











The parameter  u measures the elasticity of substitution between communication and manual
tasks and ✓u measures the factor intensity of manual tasks. The task supplies M and C are
given by the sum of each task supplied by both low-skilled domestic-born and foreign-born
workers. Letting d index low-skilled domestic-born workers, and f index low-skilled foreign-
born workers, we can write the total manual task supply as M = Nfmf +Ndmd where Nf and
Nd are the total number of low-skilled foreign-born and domestic-born workers in the economy
and mf and md are the amounts of manual tasks supplied by each low-skilled foreign- and
domestic-born worker, respectively. Similarly, we can write the supply of communication tasks
as C = Nfcf + Ndcd where cf and cd are the endogenous amounts of communication tasks
supplied by each low-skilled foreign- and domestic-born worker, respectively.
Each high-skilled worker inelastically supplies one unit of the cognitive task; aggregate
high-skilled labor Ls is simply the total cognitive task supplied in the economy. High-skilled













where Y is the produced amount of the numeraire output good. The parameter   corresponds
with the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled labor and the low-skilled aggregate.
Total factor productivity is given by A and ✓ gives the factor intensity of low-skilled labor.
Let wc, wm and ws denote the compensation for one unit of communication, manual and
cognitive tasks. As firms are perfectly competitive, these task prices are given by the marginal
products of each task. Since high-skilled workers supply exactly one unit of the cognitive task,
their income equals the task wage, hence we have ys = ws. For low-skilled workers, income
is given by the sum of the worker’s task supplies multiplied by the appropriate task prices.
Letting j 2 {f, d} index low-skilled worker types (foreign-born or domestic-born), we can
write the agent’s income as yj = cjwc +mjwm.


















That is, the total indirect fiscal effect is given by the change in income of each type of worker
multiplied by the number of workers of that type and the marginal tax rate. It’s important
to note that changes in income for low-skilled workers, dyfdNf and
dyd
dNf
, arise for two reasons.
First, low-skilled immigrant inflows change task prices wc and wm, and therefore the incomes
of foreign- and domestic-born workers. Second, income will change as a result of changes in
task supplies in response to these inflows. For example, if low-skilled domestic-born workers
respond to immigrant inflows by increasing the amount of communication task they supply
(perhaps by moving into managerial occupations), this will lead to an additional change in
native income in response to immigrant inflows. We show in Appendix B.5 how this formula
can be written as a function of structural parameters and task supply elasticities.
Quantification We quantify the indirect fiscal effects by utilizing estimates of task inten-
sities from ONET and selected parameter estimates from Peri and Sparber (2009). The
procedure we use for estimating income and marginal tax rates are similar to those in other
sections. Details can be found in Appendix C.5. Here we focus on the parameter estimates
we take from Peri and Sparber (2009).
Peri and Sparber (2009) estimate the elasticity of substitution between manual and com-
munication tasks,  u, using state level variation in immigrant inflows. We set  u = 1 and
set the elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skilled workers as   = 1.75, based on
their estimates. Peri and Sparber (2009) also use this variation to estimate the elasticities
of task supplies with respect to the immigrant share of low-skilled workers. We directly use
these estimates of task supply elasticities. Most notably, they find that domestic-born workers
respond to low-skilled immigrant inflows by increasing their communication task supply and
that foreign-born workers do not change their task supplies in response to immigrant inflows.
Results First of all, we calculate the indirect fiscal effect which would result if workers did
not adjust their occupation. We find this number to be $1,115, which is in a similar ballpark as
the numbers we found in Section 5.However, once we allow for endogenous occupation choice,
low-skilled domestic-born workers respond by switching into higher-paying communication-
intensive occupations. This increases their incomes and thus their tax payments. Holding
task prices constant, this occupation upgrading leads to an additional fiscal effect of $899.76
Finally, these occupation changes lead to additional changes in the equilibrium task prices
76Note that this effect constitutes a fiscal externality. This fiscal externality is much larger than the
externality resulting from hours worked and participation responses in the canonical model.
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leading to an additional fiscal effect of $117.77 Ultimately, the indirect fiscal effect is equal to
dRPSind =$2,131 with endogenous occupation choice.
A.5 Decreasing Returns to Scale
Consider a homogeneous production function with two inputs,
Y = F (Lu,Ls) ,
where, as before, Lu =
R
Iu Li!idi and Ls =
R
Is Li!idi. Let   be the degree of homogeneity:
F (tLu, tLs) = t F (Lu,Ls). With decreasing returns to scale (  < 1), an immigrant inflow
can also lead to changes in firm profits in addition to changes in wages. Therefore, holding
labor supply constant, the indirect fiscal effects of immigration with decreasing returns are
given by:




















where ⇡ represents total firm profits and ⌧p is the tax rate on firm profits.
In the case of constant returns to scale, the indirect fiscal effects arose because of a change
in relative incomes of high-skilled and low-skilled workers. With decreasing returns to scale,
there is a second effect arising from an increase in firm profits relative to worker income. As
we show in Appendix B.6 the indirect fiscal effect of an immigrant of type i with decreasing
returns to scale is given by
dRDRSind (i) = yi
2












Consider the first term of (17), which we refer to as the “factor ratio effect”. The term  ̃u,own
gives the own-wage elasticity for low-skilled workers, holding total labor income constant.
Specifically, this term is given by  ̃u,own =  u,own + u (1   ), where u = LuwuLsws+Luwu is the
labor income share of low-skilled labor.78 This factor ratio effect gives the indirect fiscal effect
as a result of changing the relative wages of high-skilled relative to low-skilled workers.
In addition to changing the factor ratio, an influx of low-skilled labor also increases the
scale of production and therefore increases profits at the cost of worker income. We refer to
the resulting fiscal effect as the “scale effect”, which is the second term in (17). The term T̄ 0I
77This term is positive because the increase in supply of communication tasks by low-skilled workers implies
an increase in cognitive wages, an increase in manual wages but a decrease in communication wages.
78Note that  u (1   ) is the effect of immigration on low-skilled income that occurs through the scale
effect – if total income changes but the share going to low-skilled workers stays constant. Therefore, we can
think of  ̃u,own as as the change in low-skilled income from immigration minus the scale effect. Note that if
the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, then this elasticity is independent of scale and we
have  ̃u,own =  u,own.
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gives the income-weighted average marginal tax of all workers. A smaller value of   implies
lower returns to scale and therefore a greater redistribution of surplus from workers to firms.
The fiscal effects of the redistribution are scaled by the differences in the average tax rates
between firms and workers,
 
⌧p   T̄ 0I
 
.
Results To calculate the fiscal effects with decreasing returns to scale, we need estimates
of the profit tax ⌧p, income weighted marginal tax rates, the returns to scale,  , and  ̃u,own,
the own-wage elasticity of low-skilled labor, holding labor income constant. For the profit
tax, we use the weighted average of the state and federal corporate tax rates and the business
income weighted average income tax rate, which is the tax rate that applies for pass-through
businesses.79 This gives us an estimate of ⌧p = 36.8%. We estimate a marginal tax rate for
all workers as T̄ 0I = 34.2%. Finally, we take our value of   = .9 from Burnside (1996), who
estimates returns to scale for US industries.80 Finally,  ̃u,own =   1 s, where again   is the
elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skilled labor.81 Therefore,  ̃u,own is the same
as the own-wage elasticity with constant returns to scale, given the same value for  .
Putting this together, we estimate that if production exhibits decreasing returns to scale,
the indirect fiscal effect associated with the average low-skilled immigrant is equal to $1,057
given an elasticity of substitution of   = 2. Recall that with constant returns to scale and
  = 2, we calculated an indirect fiscal effect with exogenous labor supply of $975. The small
increase in the fiscal effect with decreasing returns is due to the scale effect: profits increase
relative to labor income and profits face a higher marginal tax rate than labor income.82
B Theoretical Appendix
B.1 Relation between Own-Wage Elasticity and Elasticity of Substi-
tution
To understand the relationship  u,own =
Nsys
Nuyu+Nsys
  , first recall the definition of the elasticity
of substitution
79Corporations account for 60% of total net income from business. We calculate ⌧p as .6 times fed-
eral and average state corporate tax rate plus .4 times the business income weighted average effective tax
rate arising from income taxes and transfers using our ACS data. In 2017, the federal corporate tax
rate plus the average of the state income tax rates was 38.9%. Source: https://taxfoundation.org/
us-corporate-income-tax-more-competitive/ . We find a business income weighted effective tax rate
of 33.9%.
80Burnside (1996) estimates a weighted average of industry specific returns to scale of .9.
81As we show in Appendix B.6, the own-wage elasticity with decreasing returns to scale is given by  u,own =
(   1)u  1 s. Therefore, the own-wage elasticity holding labor income constant is simply given by  ̃u,own =
  1 s.
82It’s worth noting that corporate tax rates dropped substantially in 2018 to a weighted average of 25.7%.










Now consider an increase of low skilled labor by 1%. This increases the ratio of low-skilled
over high-skilled labor by 1% (since the high skilled labor stays constant). This directly implies
that the relative wage ratio @wu@ws /
wu
ws
decreases by 1  .
Next, derive the percentage change of wuws by using the cross- and own-wage elasticity. The




 u,own    s,cross. Using Lemma 1, this can be written as:  u,own +  u,own wuLuwsLs .
As a consequence, we have to have
  1
 
=  u,own +  u,own
wuLu
wsLs




B.2 Canonical Model with Labor Supply
B.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2








The indirect fiscal effect associated with an immigrant with productivity !j and hours hj























Next, we can use the definitions of own- and cross-wage elasticities to write















Applying the relationship between cross- and own-wage elasticities in Lemma 2 yields




























, we can rewrite
the above equation as
dRexind (j) = | u,own|⇥ yj ⇥
 
T̄ 0s   T̄ 0u
 
.
B.2.2 Proof of Lemma 3




(T (yi, i)⌫i + T (0, i)(1  ⌫i))midi+
Z
Is
(T (yi, i)⌫i + T (0, i)(1  ⌫i))midi.
Denote by dwuwu and
dws
ws
the equilibrium changes in wages that occur due to the immigrant and
the implied endogenous responses of the natives along both the intensive and the extensive




























B.2.3 Proof of Lemma 4
The set of integral equations is given by


















































This is a system of integral equations with a simple solution because the kernels of the
integral equations are separable. Let’s first consider the integral equation for low-skilled




























































is the income-weighted average of


























































































B.2.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Now we have described the equilibrium changes of labor supply. We can now turn to the













































































1 + ⇠̄u| u,own|+ ⇠̄s| s,own|
 




To obtain the Kaldor-Hicks surplus, one has to add up the monetized gains and losses of all
citizens and the fiscal effects. Denote the direct fiscal effect by dRdir. The indirect fiscal effect
is given by (see Proposition 3):
dRind(i) =
yi| u,own|
1 + ⇠̄u| u,own|+ ⇠̄s| s,own|
 
T̄ 0s   T̄ 0u + "sT 0s   "uT 0u + ⌘sTpart,s   ⌘uTpart,u
!
.
The monetized utility effect of native individuals is simply given by the change in income
that arises due to the change in wages. The changes in income due to changes in labor supply
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do not matter for utility due to the envelope theorem. Hence, an individual of type i with
ei = e has a utility change of




where dwewe is given in Lemma 4. Integrating over all natives and adding the monetized gains
and losses to the tax revenue effects gives the immigration surplus:
SurplusKaldor Hicks(i) = dRdir+
yi| u,own|
1 + ⇠̄u| u,own|+ ⇠̄s| s,own|
 
"sT 0s   "uT 0u+⌘sTpart,s   ⌘uTpart,u
!
.
The indirect fiscal effects that were not caused by fiscal externalities and the monetized
gains and losses from natives add up to zero. What the government gains is what native
taxpayers in aggregate lose.
Note that this only holds because all gains and losses are given equal weight. If we follow
Hendren (2020) and weight the monetized utility gains and losses by the inverse optimum
weights g(y), then we obtain:
Surplusweighted(i) =dRdir +
yi| u,own|
1 + ⇠̄u| u,own|+ ⇠̄s| s,own|
⇥
 
gs (1  T 0s)  gu (1  T 0u) + T̄ 0s   T̄ 0u + "sT 0s   "uT 0u + ⌘sTpart,s   ⌘uTpart,u
!
.
B.3 Indirect Fiscal Effect with Four Education Groups and Imper-
fectly Substitutable Experience Groups
We consider an immigrant i with experience a and education e. The indirect fiscal effect is
given by:


























The first term captures the wage changes of individuals with different education levels,
whose wage unambiguously increases. The second term captures the wage change of those
with the same education but different experience, whose wage may increase or decrease. The
third term captures the wage change of those with the same education and experience, whose
wage unambiguously decreases.
Now we rewrite it in terms of elasticities




























Let Yae = waeLae give aggregate income for a given education-experience group and let Ye =P
a Yae give aggregate income of a given education group. Further, let e =
Ye
Y give the income
share of education group e and let a,e = YaeYe give the income share of experience group a within
education group e. Some standard algebra shows, that the wage elasticities read as follows for






















=  e,ea,e +  ̃a0e,ae.








=  e,ea,e +  ̃ae,ae.
Plugging this into the indirect fiscal effect formulas gives:



































This can be rewritten as






















Now use the definition of the income shares to write this as:
















dRBorjasind (a, e, i) = yi
⇥ 









B.4 Indirect Fiscal Effects in Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013)
The indirect fiscal effect for an immigrant of skill group j is given by



























Plugging this into the indirect fiscal effect and rearranging yields:









which can be rewritten in terms of elasticities as








where  k,j = @wk@Lj
Lj
wk
gives the cross-wage elasticity of k’s wages with respect to Lj.
Given the CES production function, these cross-wage elasticities are all given by  k,j = 1 j,
where j = wjLjY . Plugging in and rearranging yields
















Dividing and multiplying by
P
k 6=j k = 1  j yields













is the income weighted tax of all other group k 6= j.
dRDFPind (j, i) = yi ⇥
 
T̄ 0k 6=j   T̄j
 
⇥ | j,own| = yi ⇥
 




where we used 1 j  = | j,own|.
B.5 Indirect Fiscal Effect in Peri and Sparber (2009)






















+ dRSORTind| {z }
sorting effect
+ dRPRind .| {z }
secondary price effect
(21)
The first term captures the indirect fiscal effect that would arise if task choices were exogenous.
The second term gives the change in tax revenue that is due to the change in task supplies
– holding task wages constant. The third term is similar to the first term again in that it
captures changes in wages for given task supplies. It captures the changes in tax payment
due to wage changes that are due to the changes in task supply of low-skilled natives and
low-skilled (previous) immigrants.
To arrive at this decomposition, first note that the effect of immigration Nf on task supplies































where (·)ind captures the indirect effect through changes in task supply. These indirect effect







































Note that ⌘j and ⌘mj are general equilibrium elasticities that captures all adjustments and
higher order wage effects. The reason why we express – in contrast to our analysis in the main
model – the formula in terms of such general equilibrium elasticities is that Peri and Sparber
(2009) provide estimates for these general equilibrium elasticities.
As a next step, note that the wage changes of high-skilled, foreign and domestic low-skilled
workers can be written as (recall that for high skilled we have ys = ws – wage equals income










































































for low-skilled natives. For the latter two, the changes in wages of the manual and communi-




























































Rearranging terms, we can now obtain (21). We describe the three terms one after another. All
the terms are expressed in terms of empirical objects. For the quantification, see Appendix C.5.
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give the income elasticities of the three worker groups, holding all task supplies of a given
worker constant.
Holding task supplies constant, the production function exhibits constant returns to scale































































are ‘short run’ elas-
ticities that capture how the incomes of low- and high-skilled natives change in response to








































































































where j for j 2 {c,m} is the fraction of total income paid to factor j, and uj is the fraction
of total low-skilled income paid to factor j.


























The terms in brackets multiplied by dNf give the change in income per past immigrant and
native. Multiplying this with their amount and the marginal tax rate gives the implied tax
effects.




























































































































































































































































B.6 Indirect Fiscal Effect with Decreasing Returns to Scale
The indirect fiscal effect associated with an immigrant of type i is




















We can rewrite this as













where T̄ 0u and T̄ 0s are the income-weighted marginal tax rates of low and high skilled labor and
⌧p is the tax on profits. First, we derive a relation between a change in profits and the change













































With constant returns to scale, we of course have that both sides are equal to zero. With
decreasing returns, profits increase and labor income decreases. Aggregate native income (sum
of profits and labor income) it not affected, however. We can therefore write the indirect fiscal
effect as:













Let s = LswsLsws+Luwu be the high-skilled fraction of labor income. Adding and subtracting 







































Rearranging the above equation yields
dRDRSind (i) = hi!i
 













































dRDRSind (i) = hi!i
 
















The term u @I@Lu is the effect of immigration on low-skilled income that occurs through the
scale effect that arises from changing the total income but keeping share going to low-skilled




change in low-skilled income from immigration minus the scale effect. Therefore, this whole






  u @I@Lu as the effect of immigration on wages, holding total labor income
constant. Let’s further assume that the production function is homogenous of degree  , where
  < 1 if we have decreasing returns to scale. Hence, F (tLu, tLs) = t F (Lu,Ls). Taking
derivatives w.r.t. to t and normalizing t = 1 yields :
Luwu + Lsws =  F,








Therefore (recall @I@Lu = Lu
@wu
@Lu




Inserting this into the indirect fiscal effect yields
dRDRSind (i) = hi!iwu
⇥ 




T̄ 0s   T̄ 0u
 




dRDRSind (i) = yi
⇥ 









where  ̃u,own =  u,own+u (1   ) is own-wage elasticity, holding total labor income constant.
To solve for  ̃u,own as a function of the elasticity of substitution, note that as shown in
Appendix B.1, we can use the definition of the elasticity of subsitution to write:
  1
 
=  u,own    s,cross. (24)
From Euler’s homogenous function theorem we know that
wuLu + wsLs =  Y.






















Solving for  u,own yields








Using wuLu Y = u and
wsLs
 Y = s by Euler’s homogenous function theorem yields









B.7 Indirect Fiscal Effect with Inelastically Supplied Capital
We show the proof for the more general CES production function. Let production Y be given
by
Y = (✓kK
⇢ + ✓lG (Lu,Ls)
⇢)1/⇢ .
We begin by solving for the relationship of factor price elasticities when capital supply is
elastic and capital supply is inelastic. For this, first consider the case when capital supply is
perfectly elastic. In this case, the capital labor ratio is constant. In this case, we can write
K = CG (Lu,Ls) where C is the constant capital labor ratio. The production function can
be written as
Y = ĀG (Lu,Ls) ,
where Ā is a constant.83 The elasticities of wages with respect to low-skilled labor with









83Concretely, note that Y = (✓k (CG)⇢ + ✓lG⇢)
1/⇢ and hence Y = (✓kC⇢ + ✓l)
1
⇢ G. Hence, the constant is




Next, consider the case in which capital supply is perfectly inelastic. Let L = wuLu+wsLsY
be the share of factor payments that go to labor, let K = 1  L, and let u = wuLuwuLu+wsLs be
the share of wage payments that go to low-skilled labor.




















Taking derivatives of these log wage functions with respect to logLu yields
 s,u =
@ log @Y@G













@ logLu| {z }
 elastu,u
,
which give the relationship between own wage elasticity with elastically supplied and inelas-
tically supplied capital.
Now, consider the indirect fiscal effect with inelastically supply supplied capital:













We can rewrite this as






















































































which can be simplified to

















Further, we know that F is constant returns to scale, which implies that wu elastu,u =  LswsLu  
elast
s,u
(recall Lemma 2). We can therefore write















Rearranging this equation yields
dRind (i) = yi
h 






⌧k   T̄ 0I
 i
. (25)
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas in capital and the labor aggregate, then K  = ↵.
C Empirical Appendix
C.1 Data Cleaning and Sample Selection in the ACS
We use data from the 2017 ACS. We limit the sample to individuals between ages 18 and 65
who do not live in group quarters. We limit our sample to household heads and their spouses,
as tax filling status is less clear for other individuals. This leaves us with a sample of over 1.2
million individuals.
When calculating taxes, we account for an individual’s wage income and business income
as sources of taxable income. All income weighted averages are weighted by wage incomes and
sample weights. When calculating the income-weighted pass-through tax rate in Section A.5,
we weight by business income.
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C.2 Calculation of Marginal Phase-Out Rates and TANF and SNAP
We begin by calculating total monthly SNAP benefits and TANF benefits for each household in
the SIPP. To deal with underreporting, we estimate these estimated monthly benefits such that
the total benefits received match national aggregates reported from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Next, we divide households by household size and estimate monthly TANF and
SNAP benefits as a linear spline in household income. We estimate a separate spline for each
household size. Next, using these function of benefits as a function of income, we can calculate
the marginal average monthly benefits as a function of monthly income and household size.
We aggregate these monthly estimates to yearly estimates by taking the income-weighted
average across months for each household in the SIPP.
C.3 Calculation of Marginal Replacement Rates of Social Security
Benefits
An individual’s social security benefits are calculated as a function of their average indexed
monthly earnings (AIME). If the current year’s income is one of the 35 highest earning years,
a $1 increase in current year income will increase an individual’s AIME by $1/35. If the
current year’s income is not one of the 35 highest earning years, a marginal increase in current
year income will have no effect on social security benefits. Further, if current year’s income is
above the maximum taxable earnings threshold, an increase in current income has no effect
on social security benefits.
We assume an individual receives social security from age 66 until their death.
Let MRR(AIMEi) denote the marginal increase in yearly social security benefits as a function
of an individual’s AIME and let Ti represent an individual’s life expectancy. The discounted















if current year income is one of the individual’s 35 highest earning years and income is below
the maximum taxable earnings threshold, and 0 otherwise, where g is the aggregate growth rate
and r is the interest rate. This gives the increase in yearly social security benefits associated
with a $1 increase in AIME. An increase in the current year’s income increase the average
career income by 1/35, which in turn increases yearly future social security benefits from the
agents retirement until death.
We estimate an individual’s AIME and 35th highest year of earning as a function of cur-
rent income and household characteristics using data from the NLSY79. The NLSY79 is a
nationally representative panel dataset which provides data on respondents from 1979 until
2016. There are a few issues with missing data that we need to resolve. First, starting in 1994,
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Income Females Males
Quintile Married Single Married Single
1 0.12 0.19 0.07 0.20
2 0.12 0.31 0.05 0.25
3 0.12 0.23 0.05 0.20
4 0.12 0.16 0.04 0.16
5 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.10
Table 9: Estimates of extensive margin labor supply elasticities from Bargain, Orsini, and
Peichl (2014) by income quintile, gender, and marital status.
individuals are only interviewed in even numbered years. We therefore assume that data in
odd numbered years post 1994 is the same as in the previous year. Further, in 2016, the last
year from which data are available, respondents are between age 53 and 60. We therefore do
not have income information for the last few years of individual’s working lives. We there-
fore assume that income for the remainder of the working life is equal to a respondent’s last
observed income.
After dealing with these data issues, we can calculate an individual’s AIME as the average
of their 35 highest income years, adjusted for inflation, and an individual’s 35th highest income
year. We calculate the average of these two statistics conditional the following characteristics:
1. An individual’s education - high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, or
college graduate
2. Whether or not an agent is married
3. 5-year age bins
4. Whether or not the agent has children living in their household
5. Quintiles of the income distribution, conditional on working and conditional on the above
characteristics.
For individuals in the ACS, we impute AIME and 35th highest earning year as the average of
these two statistics conditional on the characteristics above.
C.4 Intensive and Extensive Labor Supply Elasticities from Bargain,
Orsini, and Peichl (2014)
Tables 9 and 10 display the extensive and intensive labor supply elasticities estimated in
Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2014). The first column displays the income quintile. The next
four columns display the labor supply elasticities for married females, single females, married
males, and single males, respectively.
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Income Females Males
Quintile Married Single Married Single
1 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
3 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02
4 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02
5 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04
Table 10: Estimates of intensive margin labor supply elasticities from Bargain, Orsini, and
Peichl (2014) by income quintile, gender, and marital status.
C.5 Quantifying the Fiscal Effect in Peri and Sparber (2009)
We now calculate the indirect fiscal benefits and its decomposition as expressed in equation
21. In order to evaluate this equation, we need estimates of the following:
1. (wm, wc, ws) – the task prices of manual, communication, and cognitive tasks.
2. ( ,  u) – the elasticities of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, and











– the elasticities of task intensities with respect to immigrant inflows.
4. (Nf , Nd, Ns) – the number of low-skilled immigrants, low-skilled natives and high-skilled
workers.
5. (cf , cd,mf ,md) – the task intensities of low-skilled natives and immigrants
6.
 






– marginal tax rates faced by low-skilled immigrants, low-skilled natives,
and high-skilled workers.
We take estimates of items (1) - (3) directly from Peri and Sparber (2009). Specifically,
Peri and Sparber (2009) estimate the state level task prices of manual and cognitive tasks,
wm and wc, using variation in task supplies and wages across occupations. We take the
national average of these task prices for our measures of wm and wc. Peri and Sparber (2009)
estimate the elasticity of substitution between manual and communication tasks,  u, using
state level variation in immigrant inflows. We set  u = 1 as the preferred estimates from
Peri and Sparber (2009) and set the elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skilled
workers as   = 1.75, based on the calibration in Peri and Sparber (2009). Peri and Sparber
(2009) also use across-state immigrant variation to estimate the elasticities of task supplies
with respect to the immigrant share of low-skilled workers. They find that natives respond
to low-skilled immigrant inflows by increasing their communication task supply but do not
change their manual task supply, and that immigrants do not change their task supplies in
response to immigrant inflows. We therefore set ⌘cf = ⌘mf = ⌘md = 0 and take ⌘cd = 0.33 from
their estimates.
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Object Value Desription Source
Task Prices
wm 773 Manual task wage PS inflated to 2017
wc 820 Communication task wage PS inflated to 2017
ws 69, 311 Skilled income ACS
Production Parameters
  1.75 Elasticity of substitution, skilled and unskilled workers PS
 u 1 Elasticity of substitution, manual and communication tasks PS
Task Supply Elasticities
⌘dc .33 Elasticity of native communication task supply with respect to immigrants PS
⌘dm,⌘fm,⌘fc 0 Other task supply elasticities PS
Population Shares
Nf
N 0.069 Low-skilled immigrants as fraction of population ACS
Nd
N 0.318 Low-skilled natives as fraction of population ACS
Ns
N 0.613 Hig- skilled workers as fraction of population ACS
Task Supplies
cf 12.47 Communication task supply of low-skilled immigrants ONET and ACS
cd 19.15 Communication task supply of low-skilled natives ONET and ACS
mf 27.71 Manual task supply of low-skilled immigrants ONET and ACS
md 29.18 Manual task supply of low-skilled natives ONET and ACS
Marginal Tax Rates
T̄ 0f 0.299 Marginal tax rate of low-skilled immigrants Tax quantification
T̄ 0d 0.293 Marginal tax rate of low-skilled natives Tax quantification
T̄ 0s 0.369 Marginal tax rate of high-skilled workers Tax quantification
Table 11: Summary of data sources and calibrated values. “PS” refers to estimates taken from
Peri and Sparber (2009).
To measure (4)-(6) we follow Peri and Sparber (2009) closely using data from the 2017
ACS downloaded from IPUMS (Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder, and Sobek,
2010) and data on task composition of occupations from ONET. We define low-skilled workers
as workers with a high school degree or less. We can therefore calculate Nf , Nd and Ns
directly from the 2017 ACS as the number of low-skilled immigrants, low-skilled natives and
high-skilled workers. To estimate the task supplies, we proceed in two steps. The ONET
dataset measures the task requirement for each census occupation code. We use the procedure
described in Peri and Sparber (2009) to assign a manual and communication intensity to each
occupation. Then, for each worker in the ACS, we calculate the manual and communication
task requirements associated with the worker’s occupation. Let c̃j and m̃j represent the
average communication and manual task intensity of workers of type j.
Recall that the task supplies are defined as the task intensities multiplied by labor supply:
cj = hj c̃j and mj = hjm̃j. Note that the worker’s budget constraint can be rewritten as
yj = hj (c̃jwc + m̃jwm) ,
where task prices, wc and wm, are known values from Peri and Sparber (2009), and the average
income of workers of type j, yj, can be estimated directly from the ACS. We can therefore use
this equation to solve for hj for low-skilled immigrants and natives and therefore for all four
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Figure 3: Total marginal and participation tax rates by individual earnings. Panel (a) gives the marginal
effective tax rates as the sum of marginal races from income taxes, the social security system, and transfer
programs. Panel (b) reports the total participation tax rates implied by income taxes, the social security
system, and transfer programs.
D Further Quantitative Results
D.1 Total Marginal and Participation Tax Rates
Figure 3 shows the total marginal and participation tax rates by individual earnings as the
sum of the effective tax rates arising from income taxes, social security, and transfer payments.
Panel (a) gives the marginal effective tax rates as the sum of marignal races from income taxes,
the social security system, and transfer programs. Panel (b) reports the total participation
tax rates implied by income taxes, the social security system, and transfer programs.
D.2 Indirect Fiscal Effects in Canonical Model with Real Interest
Rate=2
In Section 3 we chose a real interest rate of 1%. In Table 12 we replicated our baseline results
under the assumption of a real interest rate of 2%. The table shows the indirect fiscal effects
of the average low-skilled immigrant. The effects range from $682 to $1,309.
D.3 Indirect Fiscal Effects in Canonical Model with Alternative Skill
Definitions
In Section 3, we followed Borjas (2003), Peri and Sparber (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri
(2012) and defined low-skilled workers as those with no college experience and defined high-
skilled workers as individuals with some college and college graduates. An alternative way to
delineate skills is to divide individuals with some college between low-skilled and high-skilled




I. No Labor Supply Responses 1,141 856 685
II. Intensive Only
Common Elasticity 1,244 977 804
By Gender and Marital Status 1,145 860 689
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,188 896 719
III. Extensive Only
Common Elasticity 1,233 959 784
By Gender and Marital Status 1,181 903 730
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,110 845 682
IV. Intensive and Extensive
Common Elasticity 1,309 1,055 884
By Gender and Marital Status 1,185 907 734
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,155 883 715
Table 12: Indirect Fiscal Effects with intensive and extensive margin labor supply responses
with real interest rate of 2%.
In this section we replicate our baseline results from Section 5, except we define skill groups
as in Card (2009), by dividing individuals with some college evenly between the groups.
Overall the indirect fiscal effects here are slightly smaller than our baseline result. This makes
sense, the skill definitions we use in this section imply a smaller high-skilled share of income
and therefore a smaller own-wage elasticity for low-skilled workers, holding the parameter  
constant. However, the results are still in the same ballpark as those presented in Section 5.
D.4 Indirect Fiscal Effects in Canonical Model with for High School
Dropouts and High School Graduates
Tables 14 and 15 show the indirect fiscal effects for the average high school dropout immigrant




No Labor Supply Responses 1,221 916 733
II. Intensive Only
Common Elasticity 1,332 1,046 861
By Gender and Marital Status 1,222 919 736
By Income, Gender and Marial Status 1,266 955 766
Extensive Only
Common Elasticity 1,295 1,008 824
By Gender and Marital Status 1,245 952 770
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,181 898 725
Intensive and Extensive
Common Elasticity 1,381 1,113 932
By Gender and Marital Status 1,246 954 773
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,223 935 757
Table 13: Indirect Fiscal Effects with intensive and extensive margin labor supply responses
with alternative skill definition.
Elasticity of Substitution
1.5 2.0 2.5
I. No Labor Supply Responses 1,108 831 665
II. Intensive Only
Common Elasticity 1,208 949 781
By Gender and Marital Status 1,112 835 669
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,149 866 695
III. Extensive Only
Common Elasticity 1,177 916 749
By Gender and Marital Status 1,139 870 704
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,082 823 665
IV. Intensive and Extensive
Common Elasticity 1,254 1,011 847
By Gender and Marital Status 1,142 874 708
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,120 857 694
Table 14: Indirect Fiscal Effects for high school dropouts with intensive and extensive margin




I. No Labor Supply Responses 1,433 1,075 860
II. Intensive Only
Common Elasticity 1,563 1,227 1,010
By Gender and Marital Status 1,438 1,080 865
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,485 1,120 899
III. Extensive Only
Common Elasticity 1,523 1,184 969
By Gender and Marital Status 1,473 1,125 911
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,399 1,065 859
IV. Intensive and Extensive
Common Elasticity 1,622 1,308 1,095
By Gender and Marital Status 1,477 1,130 915
By Income, Gender and Marital Status 1,449 1,108 897
Table 15: Indirect Fiscal Effects for high school graduates with intensive and extensive margin
labor supply responses. See description from Table 3.
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